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I. INTRODUCTION
On July 5, 1991, bank regulators in seven nations1 instituted enforce-
ment actions against the Bank of Credit and Commerce International
(BCCI) for numerous unsafe and unsound banking practices.2 As the
corporate structure of BCCP and its past dealings illustrate, the prolifera-
tion of multinational enterprises engaged in the cross-border provision of
financial services confounds territorially based sovereigns in their attempt
to regulate that which no longer exists: a national, territorially based
banking market.4
BCCI was an international banking conglomerate organized to evade
bank regulation. The BCCI holding company was incorporated in Lux-
embourg, a jurisdiction that normally does not regulate holding company
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1. Those nations are the United Kingdom, Luxembourg, the United States, Switzerland, Spain,
France, and the Cayman Islands. Peter Truell & Nicholas Bray, Regulators World-Wide Close Down
BCCI Branches in a Coordinated Move, WAn. ST. J., July 8, 1991, at A3.
2. BCCI was incorporated in 1972 in Luxembourg and has its headquarters in London.
Founded by a Pakistani, Agha Hasan Abedi, its reaches are worldwide with over 400 branches and
subsidiaries in 69 countries. Control of the bank passed last year to Sheik Zayed of Abu Dhabi
because of Mr. Abedi's failing health. Jonathan Beatty & S.C. Gwynne, The Dirtiest Bank of AU: How
BCCI and its "Bank Network" Became a Financial Supermarket for Crooks and Spies - and how the US is
Trying to Cover Up Its Role, TimE, July 29, 1991, at 42, 44-46. See also J. Virgil Mattingly & William
Taylor, Statement Before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Communica-
tions of the Committee on Foreign Relations (Aug. 1, 1991), in FED. RssmvE BuL., Oct. 1991, at 791.
3. For a chart of BCCI's corporate structure, see BCCI and Mr. Pharaon, WALL ST. J., July 8,
1991, at A6.
4. As one magazine has remarked: "[B]anking has become international; supervising it has
not." Home Thoughts from Abroad, THE ECONOwsT, Aug. 17, 1991, at 74. See also Anant K. Sun-
daram, National Sovereignty to Blame for BCCI Scandal, WAu. ST. J., Oct. 24, 1991, at A17.
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activities.5 The global banking structure of BCCI was composed of sub-
sidiaries, which limited each national regulators' oversight jurisdiction to
the subsidiaries organized within their respective territories. No single
bank regulatory agency was in a position to oversee the consolidated ac-
tivities of the BCCI holding company, 6 apparently permitting BCCI to
engage in a variety of fraudulent and secret transborder transactions. 7
The new European Economic Community (EC) financial services
regulatory structure, which will be completed when the Second Banking
Directive8 is implemented on January 1, 1993, 9 will be able to prevent
some, but not all, of the types of abuses engaged in by BCCI. The EC
regulatory structure mandates certain minimum standards for authorizing
institutions. It also centers regulatory control in one state. By defining
the scope and location of regulatory competence based largely on the
principal state of operation (Home state)10 of the credit institution11 the
short-term goal is to create easily enforceable minimum standards regard-
ing the conduct of financial affairs in Europe. The EC also seeks to facili-
tate the cross-border provision of financial services by creating a single
banking license, with primary regulatory authority over all transborder
financial services located in one Home state.
5. Jacques Loesch, Holding Companies in the Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg, in BRANCHES AND SUe-
SIDIARIES IN THE COMMON MARKET 247, 255 (2d ed. 1976). See also M. MAuREE.N MURPHY, BANK OF
CREDIT AND COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL (BCCI): SOME LEGAL IMPLICATIONS 3 (CRS Report for Con.
gress, 1991).
6. Craig Forman & Bob Hagerty, BCCI Affair Shines Spotlight on Regulatory Maze, WALL ST. J.,
July 11, 1991, at A7.
7. According to press reports, BCCI reportedly was a bank engaged in global fraud. Those
fraudulent activities allegedly included "conducting secret shipments of guns and drugs, doing busi-
ness for secret services (including the CIA), helping assorted dictators hide money looted from their
national treasuries, and along the way dabbling in intimidation, blackmail and perhaps murder."
BCCI Update, WALL ST. J., July 23, 1991, at A22 (citing Beatty & Gwynne, supra note 2, at 42). See
also Nicholas Bray, BCCI Reportedly was Being Examined for Alleged Links to Terrorist Groups, WALL ST.
J., July 22, 1991, at A6. For complete details regarding these allegations, see Beatty & Gwynne, supra
note 2, at 42. On December 19, 1991, BCCI, acting through its receiver, plead guilty to various
criminal charges in the United States. Liquidators Forfeit BCCI Assets in US, WAL. ST. J., Dec. 20,
1991, at A4.
8. Second Council Directive 89/646 of 15 December 1989 on the Coordination of Laws, Regu-
lations and Administrative Provisions Relating to the Taking Up and Pursuit of the Business of
Credit Institutions and Amending Directive 77/780, 1989 O.J. (L 386) 1 [hereinafter Second Banking
Directive].
9. Id. art. 24(1).
10. Id. arts. 1(7)1(8) (defining Home and Host member states).
11. A credit institution is defined as "an undertaking whose business is to receive deposits or
other repayable funds from the public and to grant credits for its own account .... ." First Council
Directive 77/780 of 12 December 1977 on the Coordination of Laws, Regulations and Administrative
Provisions Relating to the Taking-Up and Pursuit of the Business of Credit Institutions, art. 1, 1977
O.J. (L 322) 30, 31, as amended by Council Directives 85/345, 86/534, 89/646, and by the 1979 and
1985 Acts of Accession [hereinafter First Banking Directive].
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By relying on economic rather than territorial factors to provide the
legal basis for regulatory jurisdiction, the financial services regulatory sys-
tem seeks to prevent or pre-empt conflict-of-laws relating to the conduct
of cross-border banking business by providing clear, predictable, and pre-
emptive choice-of-law rules before disputes arise.12 These choice-of-law
rules13 provide one of the most helpful frameworks for analyzing14 the
short-term and long-term goals of the EC in regulating transborder finan-
cial activity. Viewed from this perspective, 15 the location of primary regu-
latory control in a financial institution's Home state, in concert with the
harmonization of certain standards relating to the safety and soundness of
that institution, suggests the long-term focus of the EC: coordination of
monetary policy to facilitate economic and monetary union in Europe. 16
This financial services regulatory structure indirectly lays the ground-
work for monetary union in three ways. First, the regulatory structure
creates a single banking license that will facilitate the transborder provi-
12. Conflicts and choice-of-law rules are creations of national systems of law intended to deal
efficiently and fairly with the collision of opposing legal principles in one sovereign's courts (conflict-
of-law) or legislatures (choice-of-law). In general, choice-of-law rules reflect ex ante normative choices
by sovereigns and private parties of the most desirable legal rules to apply in a specific situation.
Conflict-of-law rules can be said to operate ex post by choosing between competing legal rules on a
case-by-case basis. Conflict-of-law rules thus address a sovereign's judicial competence. Choice-of-law
rules, on the other hand, address a sovereign's prescriptive competence. Neither set of rules directly
address a sovereign's regulatory competence. However, both sets of rules address a sovereign's related
powers to prescribe and enforce such rules of law. D. LASOK & P.A. STONE, CONFLICT OF LAWS IN THE
EURoPEAN COMMUNm 3-5 (1987).
For a general discussion of conflicts and choice of law principles in the EC, see 4 RICHARD M.
BUXBAUM & KLAus J. HopT, INTGrRATIOn THROUGH LAW. LEGAL HARMONIZATION AND THE Busn.ss
ENTERPRusE 62-63 (Mauro Cappelletti et al. eds., Integration Through Law Series 1988); LASOK &
STONE, supra; Fausto Pocar, Etude Comparative des Rigles de Conflit de iuridictions dans les Etats Membres
de la C.EE., in THE INFLUENCE OF THE EURoPEAN CoMMUNImEs upoN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
THE MEMBER STATES 77, 81 (1981).
13. "Scattered here and there [in the EEC Treaty] are the provisions which can be regarded as
embryonic conflict rules, or perhaps as the ground from which such rules may develop in the van of
the legal integration of the Community." LASOK & STONE, supra note 12, at 29.
14. "[A]s trading and payments cross national boundaries, issues of... [howl regulatory jurisdic-
tion is distributed between the national jurisdictions [arise] .... The appropriate analysis is a con-
flicts-of-law analysis where one attempts to balance the interests of the respective jurisdictions."
Andrea Corcoran, Remarks at the American Society of International Law 83rd Annual Meeting (April 5,
1989), 1989 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L PROC. 54, 54.
15. Id.
16. The Second Banking Directive preamble specifically recognizes this link as follows:
Whereas there is a necessary link between the objective of this Directive and the liberaliza-
tion of capital movements being brought about by other Community legislation; whereas in
any case the measures regarding the liberalization of banking services must be in harmony
with the measures liberalizing capital movements; whereas where the Member States may
... invoke safeguard clauses in respect of capital movements, they may suspend the provi-
sion of banking services to the extent necessary for the implementation of the above men-
tioned safeguard clauses ....
Second Banking Directive, supra note 8, pmbl., para. 22.
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sion of financial services.17 The single license will increase the trans-
border flow of capital, through increased merger activity and daily
banking operations involving cross-border financing transactions. This
will create a single capital market in fact, if not in name. Second, the
structure specifically does not harmonize deposit insurance and monetary
policy matters. Since most other significant aspects of the banking busi-
ness will be harmonized by the Second Banking Directive, or other re-
lated financial services directives, this lack of harmonization will focus
attention on the need to coordinate related policies, thereby facilitating
efforts to create a more formal monetary union. The implications of the
BCCI closure will be used to illustrate the close links between monetary
and banking policies in the deposit insurance context. Third, the regula-
tory structure requires coordination and consultation between national
supervisory authorities regarding issues previously considered as purely
domestic. This could build a critical precedent for intergovernmental co-
operation that will be crucial as the movement toward monetary union
progresses.
Taken together, these three aspects of the financial services regula-
tory structure create the institutional backdrop for monetary union by
increasing both the financial interdependence among member states and
the scope of shared decision making regarding fiscal and monetary poli-
cies. In order to remain within the framework of the EEC Treaty, this
long-term goal can be accomplished only indirectly through financial serv-
ices regulatory legislation; formal monetary union would involve cessions
of national sovereignty which lie outside the binding obligations of the
Treaty.'8
In order to more fully develop these arguments, this article is divided
into three sections. Each section uses the BCCI example to illustrate the
strengths and weaknesses of the regulatory system set up by the Second
Banking Directive. Section II discusses the regulatory climate in which
the Second Banking Directive developed. Section III examines the efforts
taken by the EC to regulate the business of banking through key financial
services directives. It will particularly focus on initial authorization, regu-
lation of branching activities, prudential supervision of daily activities,
17. Id. pmbl., para. 8, art. 18(1).
18. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EURoPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [EEC TREArY]. For a detailed
discussion of the EC's institutional organization and legislative process, see AUDREY WINnr Er AL.,
EUROPE WIHotrr FRoi -rns: A LAWYE's GUIDE (BNA Corporate Practice Series, 1989). For a collec-
tion of EEC legislation, see BLAcKSToNE's EEC LEGSLAsnON (Nigel G. Foster ed., 1990).
While a new treaty providing the legal framework for such a union recently was concluded, Alan
Riding, Europeans Agree on a Pact Forging New Political Ties and Integrating Economies, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
11, 1991, at Al, this article will limit its discussion to the EEC Treaty and its limits, since the Second
Banking Directive derives its legitimacy from that earlier treaty.
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and the importance of the Home versus Host state determination. Sec-
tion IV considers the long-term intention of the EC to facilitate a formal
monetary union through financial services legislation.
II. THE SECOND BANKING DIRECTIVE
The EC framers recognized the impact that increased economic in-
terdependence would have on capital movements and financial activity. 19
Although the explicit focus of the EEC Treaty was the creation of a com-
mon market for goods,20 the framers obligated treaty signatories not only
to provide free movement of goods21 and persons, 22 but also to provide
free movement of services2 3 and capital.24 The true test of the Treaty
comes now, as it expands its reach to regulate the second-order conse-
quences of integration: increasingly international financial activity.
The growing volume of trade in goods requires a commensurate in-
crease in the transborder payments and finance mechanisms which make
trade feasible.25 National regulations designed to protect the safety and
soundness of national financial services markets can impede this process
by imposing different conditions on financial institutions seeking to con-
duct business in their territories. Facilitation of the cross-border provi-
sion of financial services will complete the common market and thus serve
as a policy justification for the banking law reforms in the EC.26
19. With one exception, this recognition has so far been in the form of a regulation or directive.
The one exception is a recommendation regarding deposit insurance. Commission Recommendation
of 22 December 1986 Concerning the Introduction of Deposit-Guarantee Schemes in the Commu-
nity, 1987 OJ. (L 33) 16 (1987) [hereinafter Deposit-Guarantee Recommendation]. Currently, most
member states have such schemes, but they "differ widely in their legal structure and in their protec-
tive scope." Michael Gruson & Wolfgang Feuring, The New Banking Law of the European Economic
Community, 25 Irr'L LAW. 1, 37 (1991).
20. As one commentator has stated, "[T]he law has been shaped to meet the economic expecta-
tion of free trade." Lord Alexander of Weedon QC, Europe 2000: 77Te New Frontier for the Law, 5 J.
INT'L BANKING L 225, 225 (1990).
21. EEC TREATY arts. 9-37.
22. Id. arts. 48-51.
23. Id. arts. 59-66.
24. Id. arts. 67-73.
25. In the EC, the relationship between BCCI and the Gokal shipping firm is a good example of
the nexus between international trade and the banking business. According to press reports, as one
of BCCI's first customers, the firm grew into "one of the world's biggest shipping companies..."
using loan proceeds from BCCI. Marcus W. Brauchli & Peter Truell, Sink Hole: Family Shipping Firm
is One Reason BCCI Lost So Much Money, WALL ST. J., Aug. 15, 1991, at Al. The firm's subsequent
inability to repay those loans and BCCI's attempts to falsify its own accounting records to mask the
non-performing status of the loans, however, "helped transform BCCI into a factory of financial
fraud. Covering up the problem involved creating 750 phony accounts, through which passed
roughly $15 billion in funds over 15 years .... Id.
26. Second Banking Directive, supra note 8, pmbl., paras. 5 (referring to the Directive as "the
essential instrument for the achievement of the internal market ... from the point of view of both the
freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide financial services, in the field of credit institu-
Winter 1992]
94 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW
The ability of the EC institutions to declare laws regarding matters
that traditionally have been left to national regulation (such as financial
services regulation) requires a substantial shift of sovereignty from mem-
ber states to EC institutions.27 Member states condone this shift because
of their belief that the cession of sovereignty regarding common economic
or monetary policies will serve individual national interests.28 The con-
flict and choice-of-law prism again provides a helpful perspective for ana-
lyzing this rule-making process2 9 since those rules seek to provide a
certain degree of comity or deference between the courts of different legal
systems within a federal system. The EC legislative process takes on fed-
eral characteristics by forcing member states to engage in an interest-bal-
ancing process at the legislative drafting stage rather than at the
implementation stage. 30 This ensures that comity extends to all member
tions ... ."), 22 ("a necessary link between the objective of the Directive and the liberalization of
capital movements").
The Directive, in turn, derives its power from the EEC Treaty. EEC Treaty provisions are bind-
ing or directly applicable upon its signatories as a matter of public international law. Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. Therefore, the Treaty obligates
member states to provide freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services for all financial
institutions incorporated in any member State. Secondary legislation promulgated by the EC (such as
directives) defines the character and scope of these freedoms. Upon adoption through the EC law-
making process, this secondary legislation legally binds member states to conform their individual
national laws to the standards prescribed at the supranational level. EEC TREATY art. 189.
27. Classical legal theory has defined law as commands from a sovereign. "A law is a formal
general command of the state or other organized body; the Law is the body of rules which the courts
of that body apply in deciding cases." JOHN CHIPmAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCEs OF THE LAW
110 (2d ed. 1972) (emphasis in original). Also, general rules of conduct "laid down by an administra-
tive organ of a political (or other) organized body.. ." are seen as sources of law. Id at 112. The EC
and its secondary legislation fit squarely within this conception of "law-giver," even though its "sover-
eign" power to declare the law is mainly based on intangible legal and political obligations between
independent states rather than on traditional control over a territorial area exercised by one (federal)
sovereign. For a general discussion of sovereignty and law, see id.
28. See, eg., Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse administratie der belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1, 12,
1963 C.M.L.R. 105, 129 (1963). The EC harnesses the member states' national interests to create EC
common policies that reflect the interstate nature of the Community. For legislation to be promul-
gated, the Council of Ministers must approve the legislation by a qualified majority. EEC TREATY art.
100a (as amended 1987). The legitimacy and enforceability of the EC's preemptive legal rules there-
fore extend only as far as the political will of the member states and their representatives to create and
then comply with preemptive international rules. However, "[n]ational courts have no jurisdiction to
declare that measures taken by Community institutions are invalid." Regina v. Minister of Agricul-
ture, Fisheries and Food ex. p. Federation Europeenne de la Sante Animale (FEDESA), 3 C.M.L.R.
661, 665 (Q.B. 1988).
29. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
30. Because regulations, like treaty provisions, are directly applicable in the member states with-
out requiring enabling legislation, EEC TREATY art. 189, any interests a member state wants to protect
must be discussed at the drafting stage. Thus, automatic enforceability creates "harmonization" or
uniformity of laws. However, since regulations require a high degree of political agreement, the inte-
gration process, when accomplished by regulation, is both time consuming and politically costly.
An alternate, less coercive, legislative tool is the directive, which is binding as to effect, but leaves
the means of implementation to the discretion of national jurisdictions. Id Thus, consensus is easier
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states in the formulation of the rules so that implementation of those
rules will not later be seen as intrusive. 31
While such cooperation is commonplace in federal unions, the vol-
untary limitation of sovereign powers is unique in the international con-
text, and runs counter to interstate practice in the EC.32 It can be
inferred from the title of the Second Banking Directive, which empha-
sized the coordination of laws, that the avoidance or mitigation of con-
flicts between member states regarding bank regulation was of paramount
importance. 33 The coordination of sovereign authority can be seen in the
BCCI example, where the United Kingdom assumed, without objection,
the role of lead enforcer. It was more efficient, diplomatic, and conve-
nient for the Bank of England to spearhead the enforcement action.3 4
Since the Second Banking Directive was negotiated almost two years ear-
lier, it is reasonable to infer that its allocation of regulatory and enforce-
ment competence provided the framework for this coordination. In that
sense, the regulatory action taken against BCCI serves as a precursor to
future EC enforcement actions once the Second Banking Directive is
implemented.
As mentioned earlier, the territorial tie used by the Second Banking
Directive to allocate primary regulatory jurisdiction centers on the princi-
pal place of business of the financial institution. 35 Thus, allocation of
regulatory jurisdiction is based primarily on economic rather than geo-
to reach and the legislative process moves much faster. When using directives, the EC does not bear
the political cost of enforcement since the member states are under a binding treaty obligation to
comply with the letter and spirit of the directive. Thus, a directive is a legal form used to achieve
harmonization in the law, not uniformity. Ulrich Drobnig, Un~ication of National Law and the
Uniformisation of the Rules of Private Intemational Law, in THE INFLUENCE OF THE EUROPEAN CoMMuNrTIs
UPON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw OF THE MEMBER STATES, supra note 12, at 1, 2.
31. Professor Brilmayer emphasizes the importance of distinguishing between the federal and
international context. International comity rarely forms the justification for conflict or choice-of-law
decisions since such deference to foreign sovereigns is rarely embodied within any particular piece of
legislation. Lea Brilmayer, The Extratenitorial Application of American Law: A Methodological and Con-
stitutional Appraisal, LAw & CoNTEmP. PRoas., Summer 1987, at 11, 20.
32. "Little treaty law exists to delimit state jurisdiction; some state practice exists, but much of it
suggests disagreement, sometimes quite contentious, rather than strong consensus." Pamela B. Gann,
Foreword. Issues in Extraterritoriality, LAw & CoNTE P. PROBS., Summer 1987, at 1.
33. See supra note 8.
34. For example, "several times" during 1990 and 1991 (i.e., after promulgation of the Second
Banking Directive, but before its terms became effective), Luxembourg authorities requested other
states to take the regulatory lead regarding BCCI because "[w]e can't deal with it.... It is impossible
for small countries with slender resources to do so." Forman & Hagerty, supra note 6, at A7.
35. Prescriptive authorities traditionally have chosen a territorial connection to allocate regula-
tory jurisdiction and have looked to the field of conflicts law to provide the appropriate rationale for
that allocation. Comity among the member states regarding the extraterritorial reach of each others'
laws and regulations is commonplace in the corporations law arena. BuxBAu & Hor-, supra note
12, at 63-70. See also id. at 63 nn.150-51. In fact, the European legal doctrine that allocates regulatory
jurisdiction over transnational corporations to the territory in which that company does the most
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graphic choices. The rationale is that the state where the majority of busi-
ness occurs will be the most interested and the most efficient regulatory
authority.36 These presumed efficiency gains arise from the certainty pro-
vided by clear rules allocating regulatory jurisdiction, the consolidation of
information flows into one regulatory authority, and the elimination of
conflicting informational requirements. 37 These provisions also create a
hierarchy of applicable laws which recognizes implicitly that territorially
based regulations may be inappropriate in an industry whose operations
are predominantly extraterritorial. 38
Ill. FINANCIAL SERVICES REGULATORY STRUCTURE
This section will outline four issues in the emerging EC regulatory
framework: initial authorization, regulation of branching activities after
authorization, prudential supervision of credit institutions, and the im-
portance of the Home versus Host state regulatory authority.3 9 The dis-
business (commonly termed the principal place of business or the si~ge social) "is the invention of
theorists of a Host state, not of a chartering state." Id. at 68 (citation omitted).
36. Peter S. Smedresman & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Eurodollars Multinational Banks and National
Laws, 64 N.Y.U. L Rav. 733 (1989).
37. Outside the banking context, one commentator has framed the efficiency issue as follows:
The elimination of the need to consider not merely which domestic laws may possibly have
a bearing upon a given case, but also which systems of private international law may in some
way come to be applied in the process of achieving a solution to the case, would produce a
radical simplification of the calculations involved in the ordering of human and corporate
affairs.
IAN F. FLETCHER, CoNFucT OF LAWS AND EuitoPAN CoMMuNrry LAw 5 (1982).
In allocating regulatory jurisdiction, the relevant considerations have been described as the regu-
latory interest of the jurisdiction in regulating the particular conduct and the ability of the jurisdic-
tion to supervise and assure compliance with its regulations. Corcoran, supra note 14, at 55. In the
banking context, the interest of a given jurisdiction translates into a concern for the safety and sound-
ness of a banking enterprise and for the banking system as a whole. The articulation of specific entry,
liquidity, solvency, and reporting requirements reflects a series of normative choices designed to pro-
tect bank depositors and customers, while simultaneously protecting the economy from the impact of
bank failure. Therefore, this article adopts "the modem interest analysis approach in conflict of laws,
[where] the primary objective is said to be the furtherance of legislative policies . . . ." Brilmayer,
supra note 31, at 17 (citation omitted).
38. If the provision of banking and other financial services is not yet predominantly extraterrito-
rial in scope in the EC, it soon will be. The EC's plan to liberalize the movement of services, capital,
and persons generally can be seen from the perspective of the decreasing importance attached by
financial actors to territorial affiliation. Their activities create EC-wide or global economic ties which
cut across national boundaries. See generally JOHN M. KUNE, INTERNATIONAL CODES AND MULTINA-
TnoNAL BusINEss (1985); ROBERT B. REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS (1991); W. Peter Cooke, Trends and
Developments in Global Financial Services, IssuEs IN BANKING REo., Fall 1990, at 20.
39. A comprehensive discussion of all key provisions relating to financial services is beyond the
scope of this article. For an excellent and up-to-date overview of Community legislation in this area,
see THE SINGLE MARKET AND THE LAW OF BANmNo (Ross Cranston ed., 1991); Gruson & Feuring,
supra note 19; Rene Smits, Banking Regulation in a European Perspective, 1 LEGAL IssuEs OF EUR. INTE-
ORATION 61 (1989).
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cussion will focus on the First 4° and Second 41 Banking Directives and
how they integrate with other banking legislation in the EC.4 7
A. Market Entry and Initial Authorization
1. The First Banking Directive. The First Banking Directive repre-
sents the initial step toward creating common licensing and supervisory
requirements of European credit institutions. This Directive, which took
effect on December 12, 1977, is the logical starting place for any analysis
of market entry requirements because the Second Banking Directive ex-
plicitly incorporates these provisions.43
The First Banking Directive requires EC banking market entrants to
fulfill straightforward informational requirements. At least two prospec-
tive managers, with "sufficient experience" and a "good reputation," 44
must submit a business plan providing for use of the owners' own funds45
as initial capitalization. 46 The Own Funds Directive standardizes the min-
imum amount of initial or start up capital required for authorization in
any member state47 so that all regulatory authorities have confidence in
the individuals applying for authorization to conduct a banking business.
Banking authorities in both the United Kingdom 48 and France49 require
substantially similar qualifications in their national legislation.
40. See supra note 11.
41. See supra note 8.
42. For a detailed, comprehensive, and technical analysis of the interrelationship between these
Directives, as well as other relevant EC legislation, see Gruson & Feuring, supra note 19.
43. Second Banking Directive, supra note 8, arts. 1(1)1(2), 1(7), 2(3).
44. First Banking Directive, supra note 11, art. 3(2).
45. Council Directive 89/299 of 17 April 1989 on the Own Funds of Credit Institutions, 1989
OJ. (L 124) 16 [hereinafter Own Funds Directive].
46. Smits, supra note 39, annex 2, at 85. Smits refers to this as the "four eyes" argument. Id.
47. Own Funds Directive, supra note 45, art. 2. In general:
[o]wn funds... can serve to absorb losses and therefore provide a yardstick for the regula-
tory authorities of the solvency of a credit institution; ... [they also] serve as the reference
basis.., for a number of other supervisory standards like the capital adequacy, the limita-
tions on large exposures, and the limitations of participation in nonbank entities. A credit
institution's own funds consist of its capital elements basically similar to the ones in the
Basle Agreement and the risk-based U.S. Capital Adequacy Guidelines.
Gruson & Feuring, supra note 19, at 19 (citations omitted). Primary components of "capital ele-
ments" often include stocks and convertible instruments held by the bank, the bank's surplus and
capital reserves, and allowances for loan and lease losses. These and other components are often
subject to applicability restrictions that vary from nation to nation and state to state. Id.
48. The Bank of England cannot grant a banking license when the applicant has not met certain
minimum criteria for authorization. Banking Act, 1987, S 9(2), in HALSBURY'S STATUTEs 538 (4th ed.
1987). Schedule 3 of the Banking Act requires as "Minimum Criteria for Authorisation" that the
applicant be a "fit and proper person to hold the particular position ...." Id. Schedule 3, S 1(1), at
637. Paragraph 1(2) looks to such personal characteristics as probity, competence, and soundness of
judgement, and diligence. Id. 5 1(2), at 637. In addition, past conduct indicating dishonesty may be
grounds for refusing entry into the banking business. Id. 1(3), at 637. Finally, British law mirrors
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These are hardly onerous or controversial requirements. Indeed, if
the First Banking Directive was in force when BCCI sought entry into the
EC banking market, its informational requirements could easily have
been met.50 Upon expansion into Europe in the early 1970's, the BCCI
founder, Mr. Agha Hasan Abedi, was a twenty-year international banking
business veteran (based in Pakistan).51 His reputation was of a progres-
sive banker concerned with modernization and building a deposit base.52
When regulators inquired into his reputation they would have found it
impeccable; 53 his associates included world leaders, military commanders,
and many of the Mideast aristocracy.5 4
After the BCCI debacle, one might express concern regarding uni-
form construction and application of the sufficient experience and good
reputation requirements set forth in the First Banking Directive. Na-
tional (Home state) officials might now be encouraged to conduct a more
critical inquiry into the quality of an applicant's past management prac-
tices. This is especially true if an applicant such as Mr. Abedi was de-
scribed as having "a world view that valued patronage and privilege above
all. He never came to terms with the modern rules of the capitalist
game." 55
However, this market entry analysis overestimates the importance of
the initial authorization decision. Under the First Banking Directive,
since each member state controlled access only to its own territorial bank-
ing market, the possibility for diverging national standards to affect an-
the Second Banking Directive's "four eyes" requirement by requiring that "[a]t least two individuals
effectively direct the business of the institution." Id S 2, at 638.
49. JEAN-Louis RiVES-LANoE & MONIQUE CONTAMINE-RAYNAUD, Daorr BANcAIRE 27 (5th ed.
1990). These requirements have only gained salience in recent years, following the privatization by
the French government of many banks and the expansion of permissible activities to include univer-
sal banking. See RoB DIxoN, BANKING IN EUROPE: THE SINoi- M"E 8 (1991). For excellent histori-
cal overviews of French banking, see BANIaNo STRUCTURES AND SOURCES OF FINANCE IN THE EUROPEAN
CoMMuNrry 31-74 (Anne Hendrie ed., 4th ed. 1981) [hereinafter BANINO STRuCTUREs]; Christian de
Boissieu, The French Banking Sector in die Light of European Financial Integration, in EUROPEAN BANKING IN
THE 1990's 183 (Jean Dermine ed., 1990).
50. Luxembourg erects no entry barriers to foreign banks, but it does require higher start up
capital from them. It also provides for free capital movements and universal banking. DIXON, supra
note 49, at 17. See also BANKING STRucTuREs, supra note 49, at 201-26.
51. Najam Sethi, BCCI Founder: These Things Happen, WALL ST. J., July 29, 1991, at A10.
52. Id.
53. A close friend stated, "Over here [in Pakistan], he's a legend, a demigod .... There's noth-
ing that can be said in the Western press that can damage his reputation here." John Bussey, Illness
Mutes the Founder of BCCI, WALL ST. J., July 16, 1991, at Al1.
54. Sethi, supra note 51, at A10.
55. Id. Mr. Agha Hasan Abedi, 68, was born in 1922 in India and was raised a Muslim. After
obtaining his law degree, Mr. Abedi joined a Pakistani bank, Habib Bank. In the late 1950s, Mr.
Abedi left Habib Bank to set up a rival bank, United Bank, Ltd. With this success, he set out to
establish a Third World Bank abroad, BCCI. Mr. Abedi gave up control of BCCI in 1988 when he
began suffering health problems. Id.
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other nation's banking market was limited. The First Banking Directive
did not require member states to recognize licenses granted by other
member states. The member states were also free to impose their own
solvency and monitoring requirements on branches seeking to conduct
banking business in their territory. Territorially ambitious banks and
other financial institutions (both EC and non-EC) faced compliance with
up to twelve separate regulatory systems.56
The lack of license recognition created de facto branching restrictions
and inhibited the growth of cross-border banking business. Any econo-
mies or efficiencies of scale gained through territorial expansion would be
offset by the regulatory costs of expansion, thereby hampering the liberal-
ization of capital and services contemplated by the EEC Treaty. To
counter this effect, the Second Banking Directive mandates mutual recog-
nition of banking licenses among the member states.57 Under the Second
Banking Directive, additional licensing requirements imposed by member
states regarding previously licensed or approved goods or services are im-
permissible barriers to trade and are actionable in a court of law.58
2. The Second Banking Directive. Providing for mutual recognition
of banking licenses vests the Home state59 with significant control over
access to the EC banking market. Despite differences between regulatory
regimes, once a member state has authorized a credit institution, that au-
thorization is valid in all other member states. 60 Existing national regula-
tory structures are used to enforce EC standards.61 Thus, the Second
Banking Directive does not create an EC-wide regulatory institution to
issue the single license or to enforce the standards set forth in either the
First or Second Banking Directives.62
56. Philippe Vigneron & Aubry Smith, The Concept of Reciprocity in Community Legislation: The
Example of the Second Banking Directive, 5 J. INT'L BANKING L 181, 189 (1990).
57. Second Banking Directive, supra note 8, pnbl., paras. 12, 16. This concept was first articu-
lated by the European Court of Justice in the now famous Cassis de Dijon case. Case 120/78, Rewe-
Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung flir Branntwein, 1979 E.C.R. 649, 3 C.M.L.R. 494 (1979).
Originally applicable only to goods, the case now stands for the general principle in EC law that
licensing by one member state must be recognized as valid throughout the EC. Bryan Harris, Legal
Rights of EEC Citizens, NEw L.J., Jan. 22, 1988, at 43, 43-44; Philip Webster, European Directives and the
Construction Market, GAzarrE, Feb. 21, 1990, at 18, 24.
58. That action would lie against a member state for non-compliance with the Directive's terms.
Case 80/86, Officer van Justitie v. Kolpinghuis Nijmegen B.V., 1987 E.C.R. 3969, 3986, 2 C.M.L.R.
18, 27 (1989).
59. See supra note 10.
60. Second Banking Directive, supra note 8, art. 18.
61. Under the Directive, Host states cannot require authorization or endowment capital for
branches of credit institutions authorized elsewhere in the Community. Id. art. 6(1).
62. Recently, a senior EC Commission banking expert, Paolo Clarotti, stated that "[niobody
wants to create an additional supranational bureaucracy. .. ." Forman & Hagerty, supra note 6, at
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In addition to creating a de facto single banking license, the Second
Banking Directive also harmonizes key economic and procedural aspects
of the authorization process. These provisions include minimum initial
capitalization of ECU 5 million (and exemptions from this minimum),63
informational requirements, 64 grounds for refusal of authorization,65 and
procedures for consultations between Home and Host states regarding
holding company authorizations. 66
Under the standards set by the Second Banking Directive, Mr.
Abedi might not have received authorization to operate BCCI. Such de-
nial, however, would not result from the application of new or different
standards. The pre-existing informational requirements under the First
Banking Directive remain unchanged. Denial would most likely stem
from increased vigilance following a scandal, consolidation of information
in one Home state (rather than dispersal of information among different
regulators), and a freer flow of information between regulators. 67
The Second Banking Directive does not interfere with the applica-
tion in each home state of subjective standards such as good character
and sufficient experience. These subjective standards include specific cul-
tural assumptions about the propriety of certain activities.68 Irrespective
A7. However, he also observed that if other BCCI-like scandals surface, "maybe the people responsi-
ble will change their minds." Id.
63. Second Banking Directive, supra note 8, art. 4.
64. Id. art. 5.
65. Id. arts. 4-7.
66. The consultation requirements apply to:
a credit institution which is: a subsidiary of a credit institution authorized in another Mem-
ber State, or a subsidiary of the parent undertaking of a credit institution authorized in
another Member State, or controlled by the same persons, whether natural or legal, as
control a credit institution authorized in another Member State.
Id. art. 7.
67. Regulators today (made more prudent because of the BCCI scandal) might discover that
besides a stellar reputation, Mr. Abedi also came to Europe with a "lax attitude" regarding bank
management and regarding sources of bank deposits. Sethi, supra note 51, at A10. They also might
have discovered Mr. Abedi's "'cosmic management' philosophy [under which] employees were as-
sessed as much or more on their spiritual development as on their professional performance."' Id.
More mundane, but no less worrisome activities (from a Western or European regulator's point of
view), included a consistent corporate practice of granting preferential loans to clients and associates
whatever their ability to repay or collateralize the loans, in contravention of generally accepted (West-
ern) accounting and banking practice. See Tariq Hassan, Islamic Banking and Finance, in CuaRR
IssuEs oF INTERNATiONAL FINAcLAI. LAw 93, 103 (1985) (David 0. Pierce et al. eds., 1985); L. Gordon
Crovitz, The BCCI Scandal Makes the Case for Legicentrism, WALL ST. J., Aug. 14, 1991, at A9; Peter
Truell, BCCI Boosted Its Loans to Associates Even After Abu Dhabi Bailed Out Bank, WALL ST. J., July 29,
1991, at A12.
68. These cultural considerations should be considered along with BCCI's method of operation.
"When the bank's friends didn't repay their loans, BCCI covered up with a secret bank-within-the-
bank that took deposits and used the money to make loan payments appear current." Brauchli &
Truell, supra note 25, at Al. These non-conforming and/or fraudulent records, and other questiona-
ble practices, "suggest that (the) management [of BCCIJ might have been trying to absorb some of the
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of one's opinion about the application of culturally-specific standards,
member states continue to retain prescriptive and enforcement powers
over their own banking markets. 69 The Home state also controls the ap-
plication of basic principles of administrative law and judicial review re-
garding the exercise of power granted to it under the Second Banking
Directive. 70 Since the Directive does not specify which parties have
standing to invoke review of this administrative decision, it is presumed
that Home state laws control access to the courts as well. 71
Under the Second Banking Directive, a state must permit credit in-
stitutions to operate within its regulatory jurisdiction even if that institu-
tion received its initial authorization from a more permissive jurisdiction.
This impairs the ability of a more vigilant Host state to protect its deposi-
tors from under-regulated institutions through market access restrictions.
B. Territorial Expansion Beyond the Home Market: Branching
Under the Second Banking Directive, approval for expansion by a
credit institution beyond the territorial limits of its Home state rests with
that state. 72 All branching requests must be addressed to the Home mem-
ber state, not the Host state. 73 The information required for territorial
allegedly phony transactions conducted at BCCI into the official records of the global banking com-
pany." Id. If evidence of these types of activities is readily available to regulators at the beginning,
initial access to the EC banking market might not be granted so easily by a vigilant regulator in the
wake of the BCCI scandal. For an excellent discussion of culture-specific authorization standards, see
Marcus W. Brauchli, Satisfied Customers in Bangladesh, BCCI Still Elicits Gratitude for Development Help,
WALL ST. J., July 26, 1991, at Al.
69. Indeed, this has been a point of contention between those European states which permit
universal banking (that is, those states that permit banks to engage in securities and/or insurance, as
well as lending, activities) and those which do not. George S. Zavvos, Banking Integration and 1992:
Legal Issues and Policy Implications, 31 HARV. INTL L.J. 463, 483 (1990). The Second Banking Directive
partially resolves this problem. It should also be noted that considerable controversy exists regarding
accounting standards and the need to harmonize those standards at least in Europe, if not interna-
tionally. However, a full discussion of these reciprocity issues (both bilateral and multilateral) is be-
yond the scope of this paper. Regarding conflict-of-laws and the territorial basis for prescriptive
power, see generally A.H. HERMANN, CONFLICTS OF NATIONAL LAWS WITH INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
ACTIviTY: IssuEs OF Ex-RATERsrroiAirrYT (1982).
70. Second Banking Directive, supra note 8, art. 19(3).
71. For example, in the United Kingdom, bank regulatory authorities enjoy wide deference re-
garding their actions as shown by the fact that no permanent tribunal or court exists to hear com-
plaints regarding the exercise of administrative power: the Bank of England's tribunals are convened
ad hoc, and for the limited purpose of resolving that specific dispute. Banking Act SS 27-31, at 556-
61. In contrast, the French administrative law system provides for a standing body (the Conseil
d'Etat) to review administrative actions, including those actions by the Commission de Control. BER-
NARD SCHWARTZ, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND THE COMMON LAw WORLD 108 (photo. reprint
1991) (1954).
72. Second Banking Directive, supra note 8, art. 19(1). However, "consultation with the compe-
tent authorities of the other Member State" is required regarding authorization expansions by the
various operating units of a holding company. Id. art. 7.
73. Id. art. 19(1); Zavvos, supra note 69, at 475.
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expansion is similar to that required for initial authorization: the credit
institution must "notify" 74 its Home regulator of the intended location of
expansion, 75 its expected "programme of operations ... and the struc-
tural organization of the branch," 76 its mailing address in the Host
state,77 and the names of branch management officers. 78
Thus, the Home state controls access to another state's territorial
banking market. The Home state also controls the subsequent activities
of the branch in that foreign market. It regulates significant measures of
the branch operations such as "the amount of own funds and the sol-
vency ratio of the credit institution." 79 The Home state also exercises
primary responsibility for the continued prudential supervision of that
credit institution.80 Home state discretion, and consequent opportunities
for divergence, are not as broad as the language of the Second Banking
Directive might suggest. This is due primarily to the imposition of mini-
mum applicable standards for many important EC regulatory areas.81
The Second Directive would appear to favor expansion through
branches rather than through subsidiaries by eliminating economic ineffi-
ciencies associated with territorial expansion through the use of subsidiar-
ies.82 This policy choice is significant for two reasons. First, subsidiaries
are separate legal entities formed under laws foreign or external to the
Home state.83 Thus, the preference for branching has the effect of elimi-
nating potentially thorny conflicts of laws between the national corporate
74. Second Banking Directive, supra note 8, art. 19(1).
75. Id. art. 19(2)(a).
76. Id. art. 19(2)(b).
77. Id. art. 19(2)(c).
78. Id. art. 19(2)(d).
79. Id. art. 19(3).
80. Id. art. 13.
81. See generally Council Directive 89/647 of 18 December 1989 on a Solvency Ratio for Credit
Institutions, 1989 O.J. (L 386) 14 [hereinafter Solvency Ratio Directive]; Second Banking Directive,
supra note 8, arts. 6, 10 (prescribing the minimum initial capitalization and required maintenance of
that amount); Own Funds Directive, supra note 45.
82. Separate capitalization is no longer required for cross-border branching in the European
Community. Second Banking Directive, supra note 8, art. 6(1). Also, the single license is extended to
subsidiaries so long as they "are covered by the consolidated supervision of their parent undertakings
and meet certain strict conditions." Id. pmbl., para. 18. See also id. art. 2(3) (exempting any credit
institution from the provisions of Articles 4, 10, and 12, without any mention of its legal form, that is
affiliated to a central body. This exemption is conditioned upon the institution being subject to
consolidated regulation.).
83. For an insightful analysis of the problems this duality can pose for territorial authorities
seeking to regulate transnational actors, see DouGLAs E. ROSENTHAL & WILLIAM M. KNIGHTON, NA-
TIONAL LAWS AND INTERNATIONAL CoMMERCE: THE PROBLEM OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY (Chatham
House Papers No. 17, 1982).
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laws under which a bank's subsidiary has been organized 84 and the bank-
ing regulations of the Home state as harmonized by the EC. However,
the Second Banking Directive eliminates this conflict of laws problem at
the expense of the regulatory authority of the Host state.
Second, the policy preference for expansion by branching, when
combined with the efforts in the EC to consolidate accounting85 and su-
pervision,8 6 reflects the adaptation of the "economic unit theory"87 as the
rationale for reallocating regulatory jurisdiction. To assess risk exposure
and financial health of an organization more accurately, consolidated re-
porting and supervision ignore the legal status of the different entities
within a larger corporate structure operating in different member states.
In so doing, the EC attempts to erase territorially based legal differences
by focusing on fluid economic relationships.8 8 The EC also recognizes
that the usual method of international expansion is through branching.8 9
Of course, in order to maintain public confidence, a minimum level
of comparability between the regulatory systems of the member states
must exist. 90 This is accomplished through substantive choice-of-law deci-
sions made at an EC level regarding consolidated supervision and ac-
counting standards. This ensures that the transborder activities of a
credit institution can accurately be reported and monitored. 91 In addi-
84. See generally CAREL A.V. AALDERS ET AL, EUROPEAN ASSOCIATION FOR LEGAL AND FISCAL
STUDIES, BRANCHES AND SUBSIDIARIES IN THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET: LEGAL AND TAX ASPECTS
(2d ed. 1976).
85. Council Directive 86/635 of 8 December 1986 on the Annual Accounts and Consolidated
Accounts of Banks and Other Financial Institutions, 1986 OJ. (L 372) 1 [hereinafter Consolidated
Accounts Directive].
86. Council Directive 83/350 of 13 June 1983 on the Supervision of Credit Institutions on a
Consolidated Basis, 1983 O.J. (L 193) 18 [hereinafter Consolidated Supervision Directive].
87. Previously used in the antitrust and company law contexts, "[t]he economic unit theory
ignores the separate legal status of parent and subsidiary corporations and treats the two as one
united entity for the purposes of establishing jurisdiction." Note, Extraterritorial Subsidiary Jurisdiction,
LAw & CorTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1987, at 71, 85.
88. For example, one treatise identifies the two central premises for harmonization of company
and capital market law as follows:
The first assumes that companies are the most important economic actors within the indi-
vidual member states, and that they are becoming increasingly active on a transnational
basis. The second premise assumes the existence of a substantial connection between the
harmonization of company and capital market laws ... and the advancement of economic
integration ....
BuXBAUM & Hon, supra note 12, at 167. See also Zavvos, supra note 69, at 471-72.
89. Smedresman & Lowenfeld, supra note 36, at 741.
90. Zavvos, supra note 69, at 471-72. See also Michael Blair, Europe 1992 and the Harmonisation of
Standards for the Regulation of Financial Institutions, 16 CAN. Bus. I.J. 97, 117-18 (1990).
91. Consolidated Supervision Directive, supra note 86, arts. 3-5; Consolidated Accounts Direc-
tive, supra note 85, art. 5. The combined effect of these Directives is to ensure that the transnational
activities of a credit institution can be accurately reported and monitored. For insightful articles
regarding the need for uniform accounting standards in general, see John Hatfield, Regional Recipes for
Cooking the Books, 1213 INVESTORS CHRONICLE 61 (1991) (feature article discussing differing systems of
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tion, these substantive choice-of-law decisions build opportunities for co-
operation between regulatory authorities. 92 The long-term goal is for a
convergence of underlying policies in order to minimize normative con-
flict. 93 Host member states sacrifice some sovereignty94 in favor of greater
consistency and predictability in the rules regulating the financial
sector.
95
For example, the entire BCCI organization, and not its individual
member parts, would receive the attention of this new consolidated regu-
latory structure. This focus would, at a minimum, increase the possibili-
ties for enforcement authorities to detect unlawful activities conducted by
the organization. The BCCI example also raises difficult issues of relative
enforcement competence and resources. The leadership role of the Bank
of England in coordinating an international enforcement action against
BCCI increased the perception of the British regulatory system as capable
of arresting flagrant abuses of national and international 96 banking
norms. However, it simultaneously reduced confidence in the ability of
Luxembourg to supervise complex international financial institutions.9 7
This perception may have positive repercussions if it leads to increased
regulatory competence and resources in those member states with the few-
est regulatory means.
accounting standards in Europe); Julia Irvine, EC Needs to Act on Hartnonisation, THE INDEPENDENT,
May 21, 1991, at 20.
92. First Banking Directive, supra note 11, art. 7(1); Second Banking Directive, supra note 8,
pmbl., paras. 14, 25; Consolidated Supervision Directive, supra note 86, pmbl., para. 6.
93. See generally H. Hamner Hill, A Functional Taxonomy of Normative Conflict, 6 LAw & PHIL.
227, 235 (1987) (policies and underlying norms cannot both be attained).
94. By prescribing binding rules regarding whose laws will dominate enforcement of EC norms,
member states agree to cede both prescriptive and police powers regarding bank regulation. Thus,
sovereignty is ceded through the legislative process, rather than lost in the enforcement process, since
enforcement discretion remains with the member state.
95. Presumably all member states agree as to policies of "ensur[ing] the sound and prudent
management of a credit institution" and the implementation of that policy by clearly delineating the
scope of each state's regulatory competence. Second Banking Directive, supra note 8, art. 5. This
normative choice regarding what the best rules should be becomes a conflicts provision as well. It
seeks to prevent conflicts between key regulatory jurisdictions in the application of pre-emptive har-
monized standards. Thus, the Second Banking Directive seeks to prevent normative collision as well
as normative conflict. Normative collision occurs when there is federal pre-emption of state regula-
tions which "would interfere unduly with the accomplishment of congressional objectives." Hill,
supra note 93, at 243-44.
96. The interesting questions that emerge regarding the ability and willingness of regulatory
authorities to enforce what seem to be emerging norms in the international financial arena, regarding
off-balance sheet accounting, loans to affiliates, other disclosure requirements and, of course, meas-
ures of capital adequacy, are beyond the scope of this article.
97. See Forman & Hagerty, supra note 6, at A7.
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C. Supervision of Daily Activities
Under the Second Banking Directive, the Host state may exercise
limited oversight of local branch banking business conducted by financial
institutions authorized outside its own territory. It may supervise the li-
quidity of the branches, but only "in cooperation with the competent
authorities of the home Member State" and only "pending further coor-
dination" measures by the EC.98 It may require that branches provide
"the same information as they require from national credit institu-
tions," 99 but such information may not be used as the basis for any en-
forcement actions; it may be used only "for statistical purposes."' I
The Host member state cannot automatically enforce its laws against
noncomplying branches that are regulated by another (Home) state. In-
stead, the Host state must inform the Home state of the situation and
await notification that "appropriate measures" have been taken.10' The
Host state can, however, "in the discharge of [its] responsibilities [con-
duct] on-the-spot verifications of branches established within their terri-
tory."102 This limited power vests the Home state with significant
discretion regarding a request for action. The Home state defines the
"appropriate measures" in a given situation, and must respond only "at
the earliest opportunity."' 1 3 In contrast, the Directive sets explicit dead-
lines for responding to merger 0 4 and branching05 activities.
The Host state may, however, exercise its regulatory and enforce-
ment powers in certain limited, well-defined situations, but only "after
informing the competent authorities of the home Member States ...... 106
These limitations do not prevent a Host state from taking appropriate
98. Second Banking Directive, supra note 8, art. 14(2). See also id. art. 21(1), which governs the
periodic reports a Host state may require for statistical purposes from credit institution branches.
Article 21(l) also mandates that Host states provide national treatment to branches regarding the
information requested; that is, they may not request more information from branches than is re-
quested of national credit institutions. Id.
99. Id. art. 21(2).
100. Id. art. 21(1).
101. Id. art. 21(3) ("The competent authorities of the home Member State shall, at the earliest
opportunity, take all appropriate measures to ensure that the institution concerned puts an end to
that irregular situation. The nature of those measures shall be communicated to the competent au-
thorities of the host Member State.").
102. Id. art. 15(3).
103. Id. art. 21(3).
104. Id. art. 11(1) (a maximum of three months).
105. Id. art. 19(3). Reasons for the denial of access to the Host's territorial banking market must
be provided to the rejected institution within three months. Non-action by the competent authorities
in either case creates a cause of action for the rejected institution against those authorities in the local
(Home state) courts. Id.
106. Id. art. 21(4) (providing that if an institution persists in violating the legal rules in force in
the Host member state, the Host member state, may take appropriate measures to prevent or punish
further irregularities).
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measures to prevent or punish violations of state laws "adopted in the
interest of the general good." 10 7
The extensive consolidation of regulatory control in the Home state
ironically increases the power of a single territorially based sovereign over
transnational business.108 The best examples of the profound extraterri-
torial reach of Home state regulation arise in the context of bank secrecy
and deposit insurance laws. Neither of these areas are harmonized in the
EC; however, both are closely connected to monetary policy issues. Each
of these areas, and the potential for regulatory arbitrage, are discussed
below.
1. Bank Secrecy. 109  Presently, the laws regarding what information
a bank must maintain as confidential, and the penalties associated with
illegal disclosure, vary widely between jurisdictions. 1 0 Consolidation of
regulatory authority in the Home state will minimize potential conflicts
between the disclosure laws of member states. However, it is not difficult
to imagine a situation where a Host state broadly defines the term infor-
mation and such information is required by that state "for statistical""'1
or basic conduct of business purposes 112 or for other permissible reasons.
These informational requirements may force a credit institution to dis-
close information otherwise protected by the laws of its Home state.
If BCCI was based in a Home state jurisdiction where both the Sec-
ond Banking Directive and strong bank secrecy laws were in force, consol-
idated reporting requirements and Home state bank secrecy laws would
107. Id. art. 21(5).
108. "En effet, la r~duction des obstacles constitu¢s par les fronti~res intracommunautaires enlave
aux ligislateurs nationaux une partie de leur emprise sur la localisation et le comportement
d'op&ateurs &onomiques puissants, tels que certaines soci&he transnationales." J~rn Pipkorn, Les
Mddwdes De Rapprochement Des Leislations A L'Intedieur De La CE.E., in L'INFLuENCF DES COM-
MUNAI.Ts EUROPLENES SUR LE DRorr INTERNATIONAL Piuvi DEs ETATS MEMBRES 13, 22 (Institut
Universitaire International Luxembourg Session 1979, 1981). (Ed. trans.: Indeed, the reduction of
obstacles stemming from intracommunity borders deprives national legislators of some of their power
to control the localization and behavior of powerful economic operators, such as certain transnational
companies.). The limitations on a Host state's regulatory role regarding a credit institution's safety
and soundness thus function as corollaries to the consolidation of supervision in the Home state.
109. Bank secrecy laws seek to encourage individuals to use the banking system to safeguard their
savings by protecting the confidentiality of their transactions. The laws simultaneously seek to pro-
mote confidence in the banking system as a whole as reliable and trustworthy. Usually, the laws
impose secrecy or confidentiality obligations upon banks and their employees. Richard J. Gagnon,
Abstract, International Banking Secrecy: Developments in Europe Prompt New Approaches, 23 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L 653, 661 (1990). The term can also refer to the obligations of government or semi-
official employees who must review bank activity as part of the system of prudential supervision which
promotes safety and soundness in the entire banking system. See generally id.
110. See generally Banking Structures, supra note 49; Anu Arora, Reform: Banking Law and Services,
133 Souc. J. 1076 (1989); Gagnon, supra note 109.
111. Second Banking Directive, supra note 8, art. 21(1).
112. Id. art. 16(4).
[Vol. 2:89
SECOND BANKING DIRECTIVE
protect BCCI from disclosing information regarding its European activi-
ties. Obviously, this would hinder enforcement efforts and cause conflict
between Host and Home member states. 113 The issue of bank secrecy is
raised here merely to illustrate the ease with which fundamental conflicts
between bank regulatory jurisdictions can undermine the logic of reallo-
cating regulatory power in the Home state. 14
2. Deposit Insurance. Deposit insurance systems are not harmo-
nized by the banking Directives; they also vary between jurisdictions. For
example, to safeguard local depositors, some jurisdictions might impose
any number of additional requirements on a branch operating in its terri-
tory. Such requirements could include additional, independent reporting
of financial and operating information and payment of insurance premi-
ums to the Host state." 15
The Second Banking Directive vests the Home state with primary
responsibility for prescribing the deposit-guarantee scheme applicable to
branches operating outside its territory.1 6 But, since deposit protection
is not yet harmonized in the EC, Host states may exercise considerable
oversight over those branches through their exclusive jurisdiction over
branch liquidity and monetary policy issues."17 Deposit insurance issues
could qualify as a monetary policy issue within the meaning of Article
14(2) since the two issues are intimately linked. 1 8 The monetary policy
aspects of this issue will be discussed in greater detail in Section IV.
113. The bank secrecy issue raised by the activities of BCCI has gained prominence in the 1980s.
Generally, this issue is discussed in connection with money laundering and the illicit drug trade.
Jeffrey Lowell Quillen, Note, The International Attack on Money Laundering: European Initiatives, I DUKE
J. COMP. & INT'L L. 213 (1991).
114. For example, the United Kingdom uses increasingly complex rules regarding rights of access
to British courts when one of the parties is foreign. See generally Peter Kaye, Jurisdiction of English
Courts Based upon Choice of English Law, 133 Souc. J. 1537 (1989); Peter Kaye, Jurisdictional Discretion
of English Courts (1), 134 SoLic. J. 648 (1990); Peter Kaye, Jurisdictional Discretion of English Courts (2),
134 Souc. J. 683 (1990); Peter Kaye, Jurisdictional Discretion of English Courts (3), 134 Souc. J. 703
(1990).
115. It should be noted that the EC is working on harmonization of these rules as well. See
Deposit-Guarantee Recommendation, supra note 19. See also Smits, supra note 39, at 80; Zavvos,
supra note 69, at 505.
116. Second Banking Directive, supra note 8, art. 19(3).
117. Id. art. 14(2).
118. The business of banking has long been recognized as incorporating a peculiarly public func-
tion: the maintenance of stability and prosperity in the monetary system as a whole. See generally
KENNETH SPONo, BANKING REGuLATION: ITS PURPOSES, IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFEcTs (2d ed. 1985).
Until recently, the ambit of a bank's operation was primarily national in scope and the impact of
systemic instability in the banking system affected only the national, territorial sovereign. Accord-
ingly, the definition of safe and sound banking operations as measured by solvency and liquidity
ratios, conditions for access to the industry, etc., was left to individual states. That parochial view of a
bank's public function increasingly faces pressure in today's global capital markets. See STEPHEN Ax-
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3. Regulatory Arbitrage.119  Although consolidation of regulatory
authority will not eliminate all conflicts between jurisdictions, continued
differences in supervisory vigilance 120 should not encourage significant
regulatory arbitrage in the post-1992 European banking market for sev-
eral reasons.121 First, the Second Banking Directive specifically states that
regulatory arbitrage is a permissible basis for denying or withdrawing
bank authorization.122 However, most established credit institutions are
unlikely to move their state of domicile due to differences in reporting
requirements or bank secrecy laws.12 3 It is difficult to imagine a scenario
where domestic EC institutions would relinquish decades (if not centu-
ries) of accumulated administrative and political voice in their Home state
for anticipated benefits from other jurisdictions. The same holds true for
most foreign credit institutions, many of which have been established in
the EC for many years. In short, these provisions will most likely apply,
as a practical matter, to new entrants in the EC banking market.
ILROD, INTERDEPENDENCE OF CAPITAL MARKETS AND PoucY IMPLICATIONS (Group of Thirty Occasional
Paper No. 32, 1990).
119. The Second Banking Directive defines the term as follows:
... where factors such as the activities programme, the geographical distribution or the
activities actually carried on make it quite clear that a credit institution has opted for the
legal system of one Member State for the purpose of evading the stricter standards in force
in another Member State in which it intends to carry on or carries on the greater part of its
activities ....
Second Banking Directive, supra note 8, pmbl., para. 12.
120. The Second Banking Directive requires Home member states to mandate that "every credit
institution have sound administrative and accounting procedures and adequate internal control
mechanisms." Id. art. 13(2). Again, the delicate issues of soundness and adequacy are not defined by
the Directive and, thus, are subject to national (Home state) interpretation. The Directive also re-
quires member states to delegate to the "respective competent authorities" in their jurisdiction the
optional power to "adopt or impose•., penalties or measures aimed specifically at ending observed
breaches" of "laws, regulations or administrative provisions concerning the supervision or pursuit of
their activities." Id. art. 17.
121. In fact, in a federal system, a strong argument can be made that a certain diversity and
competition between jurisdictions is beneficial. Richard A. Epstein, Federalism and Exit, Paper
Presented at the 1991 US-Canada Supreme Courts Conference on Constitutional Law (Apr. 4.6,
1991) (forthcoming LAw & CorcrmAp. PRoBs.). See also JJ. Fawcett, Evasion of Law and Mandatory
Rules in Private International Law, 49 CAMBRIDGE .J. 44, 50-53 (1990) (finding regulatory arbitrage
objectionable only in cases where it creates fundamental unfairness or in cases where it operates
against the national interest. National interest is defined as encompassing only rules expressing
strong social or economic policies.).
122. The Directive requires the competent authorities in each member state "not to grant author-
ization or to withdraw it where.. ." a banking institution engages in regulatory arbitrage. Second
Banking Directive, supra note 8, pmbl., para. 12. See also supra note 119.
123. This is especially true regarding nationalized French or Italian banks. For more information
on the nationalization of the French banking sector, see Dominique Borde & William W. Eggleston,
The French Nationalizations, 68 A.B.A. J. 422 (1982). For more information concerning the new
French regulatory structure regarding investment activities, see Alice Pezard, The New French Financial
Regulations, 134 SoLc. J. 904 (1990).
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Second, harmonizing key aspects of banking regulation in concert
with other financial services legislation makes regulatory arbitrage less ec-
onomically attractive. In other words, even though Host states retain a
significant amount of discretion under the Second Banking Directive, the
economic incentive to engage in regulatory arbitrage is minimized by the
adoption of uniform standards, including uniform minimum levels of
"own finds,"' 124 solvency ratios, 2 5 reserves, 2 6 the holding and acquisi-
tion of significant interests in credit institutions,12 7 and permissible activi-
ties.' 28 The economic incentive has also been affected by the creation of
preemptive definitions regarding the corporate structure of financial
institutions.'2 9
Third, the consolidation of reporting requirements and supervisory
authority in one Home state 30 will serve to deny some credit institutions
of benefits derived from their corporate structures. No longer can a
credit institution like BCCI escape Home state regulation in the EC sim-
ply by altering its corporate form.
It is important to note that the Second Banking Directive penalizes
only changes in corporate structure intended to evade existing applicable
regulatory authority. It does not penalize the initial choice of a permissive
jurisdiction as the point of entry into the EC financial services market.' 3'
The inherent tensions created by the preference for branches in the Sec-
ond Banking Directive and the allocation of regulatory jurisdiction among
member states reflects the classic tension experienced by federal un-
ions. 132 The first-time entrant's ability to choose between certain regula-
tory climates illustrates the flexibility a federal union must provide to its
sovereign members.' 33 Under this scheme, the Second Banking Directive
allows credit institutions already established in permissive states (such as
BCCI in Luxembourg) to enjoy the more lenient regulatory environment,
124. Second Banking Directive, supra note 8, art. 4; Own Funds Directive, supra note 45, art. 6.
125. Second Banking Directive, supra note 8, art. 19(3); Solvency Ratio Directive, supra note 81.
126. Second Banking Directive, supra note 8, art. 10(l).
127. Id. art. 11.
128. Id. art. 18, Annex.
129. Id. arts. 1(), 1(3), 1(12), 1(13) (credit institution, branch, parent undertaking, and subsidi-
ary, respectively).
130. Id. art. 13.
131. See William L Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE LJ.
663 (1974); see also infra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
132. BUXBAUM & Hovr, supra note 12, at 25-165 (comparing the American experience in harmo-
nizing state laws and the Delaware corporate law experience with similar EC efforts; also noting the
unique sovereign character of the member states which precludes the use of as wide a supremacy or
commerce clause as in the U.S. to achieve commonly defined and uniform standards).
133. See generally Epstein, supra note 121 (arguing that an inherent value of federalism is its ability
to induce competition between governments); Zavvos, supra note 69, at 466 (discussing the balance
between prudential regulation and the need to provide free competition in the EC banking market).
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if that were their principal place of business and if competition between
regulatory jurisdictions did not induce the more permissive state to alter
its laws.
Institutions established in permissive states also attain a significant
amount of protection from the stricter standards of Host states where
they operate branches. As noted, the onus of enforcing laws against
fraudulent bookkeeping and reporting would fall on the permissive Home
state, which acts with little accountability to the charging Host state.
134
Since Host states hold only residual regulatory competence, their ex-
clusive jurisdiction extends to regulating monetary policy measures,1 35
"the form and content of... advertising,"' 136 and to carrying out existing
laws adopted "in the interest of the general good."1 37 Thus, some regula-
tory arbitrage opportunities will continue to exist, albeit in very limited
circumstances.
D. Determining Home v. Host State Status1 38
Because of the potential regulatory disparities between Home and
Host states, determining Home versus Host state status is critical. For
example, according to press reports, BCCI's principal place of business
was London, vesting primary regulatory responsibility with the Bank of
England.1 39 However, if gross volume of financial activity in the whole-
sale interbank market, rather than deposit base, defines the principal
place of business for a bank holding company, 140 a different answer
emerges. BCC's principal interbank operations were conducted in Lux-
embourg,141 and the Luxembourg unit faced an extensive interbank liabil-
134. The Second Banking Directive vests primary jurisdiction to regulate the activities of author-
ized credit institutions in the state of the banks' principal place of business. Second Banking Direc-
tive, supra note 8, art. 13(1). The Consolidated Supervision Directive provides for similar Home state
oversight. Consolidated Supervision Directive, supra note 86.
135. Second Banking Directive, supra note 8, art. 14(1).
136. Id. art. 21(11).
137. Id. art. 21(5).
138. While this article will focus on the deposit taking function as the most logical indicator of
primary residence, alternate indicators of a bank's residence for purposes of regulation include
physical location and the location of the parent. Consolidated reporting requirements usually focus
regulatory authority on the location of the head office. In addition, regulation of lending activities
can also follow the location of the borrower, the lender, or the currency involved. RICHARD DALE,
THE REOULATION OF INTERNATIONAL BAuNxro 3-4 (1984).
139. BCCI and Mr. Pharaon, supra note 3, at A6.
140. Smedresman & Lowenfeld, supra note 36, at 788.
141. In fact, most interbank business is conducted by multinational credit institutions operating
in Luxembourg. Luxembourg's legislators and financial administrators have sought to promote con-
tinued use of this market in their territory by providing a number of preferential policies applicable to
those multinational banks. See generally SALVATORE MASTROPASQUA, THE BANKINO SYSTEM IN THE
CouNRES OF THE EEC: INSTITUTIONAL AND STRucTuRAL ASPECTS 43 (1978).
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ity exposure when regulators shut down the bank. 42 Estimates
concerning the extent of business conducted by BCCI in the United
Kingdom vary, characterized as being both small and large. 143
If the Second Banking Directive was in force, regulatory and enforce-
ment competence might have been vested in Luxembourg, not the United
Kingdom. Given the more permissive regulatory climate in Luxem-
bourg144 and the understaffed nature of its regulatory apparatus, 145 the
scandal might have taken longer to uncover, and international enforce-
ment action might have been more difficult to coordinate. This latter
point is true given Luxembourg's commitment to protecting the secrecy
of its Home bank activities.
However, even if Luxembourg was the Home state, the exceptions to
pervasive Home state jurisdiction (advertising, general good, and mone-
tary policy) in the Second Banking Directive would still provide the legal
basis for enforcement actions taken by the United Kingdom. The applica-
tion of these exceptions to the BCC scandal illustrates the wide discre-
tion remaining in Host states and, of course, the large potential for
conflicts of jurisdiction to exist even after extensive harmonization of es-
sential standards. Since the advertising provision is not central to the
BCCI example, the following discussion will focus on the remaining two
exceptions: enforcement of Host state laws enacted for the general good,
and enforcement of monetary policy measures.
1. General Good. Since the Second Banking Directive does not
define general good, the possibility for liberal construction of Article
21(5) by national authorities is great. It can include the credibility of the
Host state's banking, and regulatory, systems in its state and the preven-
tion of fraud upon Host state depositors and bank customers. Thus, in
the BCCI example, if the Bank of England followed the notification chan-
nels contemplated by the Second Banking Directive, its competence to act
independently of Luxembourg would seem to be permitted. However, the
Directive does limit the general good exception to truly idiosyncratic laws
that "are not subject to equivalent rules under the legislation or regula-
tions of their home Member States." 146 For example, every EC nation
142. Nicholas Bray, Court Delays Liquidation of BCCI for Four Months, WALL ST. J., July 31, 1991, at
A7.
143. Compare Nicholas Bray, BCCI Shortage May Exceed $4 Billion as a Result of Alleged World-Wide
Fraud, WALL ST. J., July 9, 1991, at A3 with Allanna Sullivan & Peter Truell, Frozen Accounts at BCCI
Include Funds Illegally Taken out of Other Countries, WALL ST. J., Aug. 15, 1991, at A4.
144. See Gagnon, supra note 109, at 674. See also MASTROPASQUA, supra note 141, at 48.
145. Luxembourg has a full-time bank surveillance staff of 40 that must oversee 180 banks with
$350 billion in assets. Forman & Hagerty, supra note 6, at A7.
146. Second Banking Directive, supra note 8, pmbl., para. 19.
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prohibits the activities in which BCCI allegedly engaged, a fact that would
most likely preclude independent enforcement actions by the United
Kingdom because its laws would not be idiosyncratic.
Actions taken by the United Kingdom in its capacity as Host state
could still fall within the Article 21(5) exception for a more technical rea-
son. The exception in Article 21(5) is broadly addressed to financial insti-
tutions. Unlike other provisions or paragraphs of this carefully drafted
Directive, the exception is not limited to credit institutions. 147 Therefore,
when the welfare of Host state depositors and constituents might be ad-
versely affected by the reluctance or inability of the Home state to ade-
quately regulate Home credit institution activity, the Host state may
enforce its own laws even if they are not idiosyncratic.14 8 Article 21(5)
broadly permits:
Host member states to take appropriate measures to prevent or to pun-
ish irregularities committed within their territories which are contrary
to the legal rules they have adopted in the interest of the general good.
This shall include the possibility of preventing offending institutions
from initiating any further transactions within their territories. 149
The other paragraphs in Article 21 do not clarify the reach of this provi-
sion. Only paragraph (1) of Article 21(5) specifically refers to credit insti-
tutions; all other sections of Article 21 refer more generally to an
institution. This deliberate use of a general term, when a more specific
one could be used, indicates the intended breadth of discretion available
to Host states acting in the general good, especially with respect to credit
institutions.
For example, the Host state also is authorized "in emergencies, [to]
take any precautionary measures necessary to protect the interests of de-
positors, investors and others to whom services are provided."' 150 In such
a case, the initiative and discretion for communicating information re-
garding action taken rests with the Host state.151 Thus, returning to the
BCCI example, the Bank of England had an excellent basis for undertak-
147. See fdU art. 21(5). A credit institution is viewed as having an official monopoly on the deposit
taking function. Id. art. I(1); First Banking Directive, supra note 11, art. 1. A financial institution, in
contrast, is defined as "an undertaking other than a credit institution the principal activity of which is
to acquire holdings or to carry on one or more of the activities listed in points 2 to 12 in the Annex."
Id. art. 1(6). Its U.S. equivalent would be a holding company. For a discussion of the monetary
policy implications and the rationale for this distinction in definition and treatment, see infra part IV.
148. Bray, supra note 142, at A7; Peter Truell & Nicholas Bray, Loss Estimates from BCCI Closure
Rise and Are Said to Total at Least $5 Billion, WAu. ST. J., July 10, 1991, at A3; Truell & Bray, supra
note 1, at A3; Keith Vaz, Think of BCCI Victims, Not BCCI Scandal, WALL ST. J., Aug. 15, 1991, at
A13.
149. Second Banking Directive, supra note 8, art. 21(5).
150. Id. art. 21(7).
151. Id. ("The Commission and the competent authorities of the other Member States concerned
must be informed of such measures at the earliest opportunity.").
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ing enforcement action, even if it was only the Host state, since its deposi-
tors were put at considerable risk through the violation of its fraud and
disclosure laws.
2. Monetary Policy. Under Article 14 of the Second Banking Di-
rective, the Host state retains "complete responsibility for measures re-
sulting from the implementation of their monetary policies."' 52 This
presents the most troublesome exception to the new regulatory scheme
because a number of banking and financing activities directly implicate a
nation's monetary policies and its monetary stability.
The most direct nexus occurs through the protection of depositors
since a failed credit institution requires national treasury or insurance
fund compensation to promote confidence in the banking system. This is
the reason for the distinction between financial and credit institutions in
Article 21 of the Second Banking Directive.15 3 Indeed, the Second Bank-
ing Directive specifically states that the harmonization efforts in the EC
financial services field are framed "with the intention, in particular, of
protecting consumers and investors."15 4 Given the scope of the BCCI
activities and their impact on depositors in the United Kingdom, the
Bank of England easily could have asserted Article 14 as a basis for under-
taking unilateral enforcement action against BCCI.
E. Preliminary Conclusions
As the BCCI example illustrates, the discretion remaining in Host
states to apply local law raises serious questions regarding the reallocation
of regulatory jurisdiction. Major discrepancies continue to exist between
national regulatory regimes.
1. Benefits of Concentrating Regulatory Authority in One Home State.
At first blush, the regulatory structure constructed by the Second Bank-
ing Directive seems to encourage a crazy quilt of overlapping authority
that would leave regulators more concerned with observing the niceties of
jurisdictional comity than actual regulation of banking activity. However,
the concentration of regulatory authority in one state is logical. Such
concentration places the burden of oversight on the state with the largest
economic interest in the continued viability of the enterprise. In so do-
ing, the EC recognizes the need for some territorial connection between
the regulator and the regulated. In most cases, that territorial tie should
be linked to the depositor base with respect to retail banking business.
152. Id. art. 14.
153. See supra note 149.
154. Second Banking Directive, supra note 8, pmbl., para. 15.
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The essential nature of a credit institution is the acceptance of depos-
its and the use of those deposits in the mobilization of credit. Unlike the
credit aspect of banking, the deposit taking function of credit institutions
remains linked to a specific territorial location regarding retail depositors.
Since the depositors rely on the prudential supervision of their local terri-
torial sovereign to guarantee the safety and soundness of the banking sys-
tem, those depositors will also turn to their government to compensate
them for any losses associated with a failing credit institution.
This normative choice of a lead regulator reflects a concern for bank
safety and soundness. Economic efficiency in the bank regulatory context
includes in its cost-benefit calculus the benefits derived from high stan-
dards of prudential regulation. 155 The clear choice of a lead regulator also
promotes certainty and confidence in the system, while providing a
method for resolving potential jurisdictional disputes. Since neither con-
flict nor choice-of-law provisions in the Second Banking Directive elimi-
nate all differences, sovereign integrity in the different legal systems is
preserved.
Thus, the state where the credit institution has the largest retail de-
positor base will be the state with the largest economic interest in regulat-
ing that credit institution in its territory. Should a conflict arise between
two states (Home and Host) where the deposit bases are roughly
equivalent, presumably the legally mandated cooperation and information
sharing provisions would provide the mechanism for those states to bro-
ker their oversight and enforcement obligations. The system created by
the Second Banking Directive, thus, will permit each member state to
share in the regulation of EC financial affairs15 6 while letting the market
freely achieve what regulation would otherwise coerce: concentration of
regulatory authority in those territorial locations where most of the EC
155. This view is to be contrasted with the view espoused by the Chicago school which advocates
using "market discipline" to arrive at the appropriate level of regulation. See generally Albert J. Bord,
Jr., Note, Banking Disclosure Regimes for Regulating Speculative Behavior, 74 CAL L. REv. 431 (1980). But
cf. Helen A. Garten, Banking on the Market: Relying on Depositors to Control Bank Risks, 4 YALE J. ON
REG. 129 (1986) (presenting arguments against market discipline as a viable approach in the deposit
insurance context). For an explanation of the balance struck between market and regulation in the
Second Banking Directive, see Zavvos, supra note 69, at 472.
156. For example, the European Court of Justice has held recently that the First Banking Direc-
tive did not impair the power of member states to lay down rules on the legal status of credit institu-
tions. Thus, Italy was permitted to classify employees of credit institutions as "public officials" or as
"persons responsible for a public service" for purposes of the application of the criminal law of a
member state. Case 422/85, Criminal Proceedings Against Graziano Mattiazzo, 1987 E.C.R. 5413,
5413, 2 C.M.L.R. 482, 482 (1989).
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banks are located and where most business is conducted 157 - France,
Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom.158
2. Problems with Concentrating Regulatory Authority in the Home State.
Concentrating regulatory authority in the Home state neither adequately
addresses the potential inability of states to meet their allocated regulatory
obligations nor permits scrutiny of a credit institution's activities that
have a direct impact on national monetary policy and stability. While
logical, the system contemplated by the Second Banking Directive is at its
weakest when the Home state is a small one, because the ability of that
state to exercise the supervisory and enforcement powers allocated to it
may be severely limited. 159 This situation raises troublesome questions
regarding the viability of the allocation of regulatory jurisdiction by the
Directive.
Of course, in the BCCI example, British regulators could be seen as
operating in conformity with the consultation provisions of the Second
Banking Directive since Luxembourg requested and approved of British
leadership in coordinating enforcement activities. 16° Indeed, that type of
diplomatic concession may become increasingly frequent as member states
attempt to comply with the Second Banking Directive's consultation pro-
visions while also protecting their national interests.
Despite the opportunities for consultation and concession, the frag-
mentation of responsibilities can undermine the logic of consolidating in-
formation flows and oversight roles. The convergence of significant
amounts of complicated financial information on understaffed regulatory
authorities could mean that the same information is effectively denied to
other regulators. Thus, even with diplomatic concessions, British authori-
ties might not have had sufficient information to initiate a coordinated
enforcement action.
When viewed in this light, the provisions of the Second Banking
Directive become problematic if the state with the largest interest is not
157. Thus, the EC has made territorial connections central to the coordination of international
bank regulation. This is consistent with choice-of-law rules that look to specific territorial ties such as
the state where a contract was created or performed. See Convention on Jurisdiction and the En-
forcement of Judgements in Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, 1972 O.J. (L 299) 32.
Articles 52(1) and 52(2) base domicile for purposes of judicial jurisdiction on the law of the territory
in which domicile is claimed. See id. arts. 52(1)-(2). However, Article 53 chooses the law of the forum
to apply to businesses. See id. art. 53. For a thorough discussion of the Convention provisions, see
Wendy A. Allwood, The Brussels Convention and International Jurisdiction, 131 SOLIC. J. 1234 (1987).
158. DixoN, supra note 49, at 23.
159. Because of Luxembourg's lack of regulatory competency, Great Britain, the state with the
greatest regulatory capacity, and domestic political interest via 120,000 small depositors, voluntarily
assumed enforcement responsibility. Forman & Hagerty, supra note 6, at A7.
160. Id.
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the state with the greatest capacity for enforcement. Such a situation
could undermine the credibility of prudential supervision even if largely
uniform standards govern the system. Although the economic efficiency
of the single license is well-documented, 161 banking regulation also seeks
to promote public goods 162 such as confidence in the banking system as a
whole and monetary stability through prudential supervision.
Since conflicts between jurisdictions are not eliminated, the altera-
tion of the traditional basis for enforcing what are now largely uniform
standards in the EC must, therefore, seek to promote more than pruden-
tial supervision and free provision of services. This alternate focus reveals
that two of the main reasons for exercising bank regulatory authority (de-
positor protection and monetary policy) remain outside the harmoniza-
tion provisions of the Second Banking Directive.
IV. THE EC'S LONG-TERM AIM: EUROPEAN
MONETARY UNION 163
The regulatory structure contemplated by the Second Banking Direc-
tive cannot be viewed in isolation from the larger economic and political
objectives of the EC, including political, economic, and monetary
union.164 Similarly, any analysis of bank regulations and functions would
161. See generally THE ExmraATUUrroaLA APPuCATION OF NATIONAL LAws (Dieter Lange & Gary
Born eds., 1987) (Report of the International Chamber of Commerce's Committee on the Extraterri-
torial Application of National Laws); Cooke, supra note 38, at 20 (adapted from Mr. Cooke's state-
ment before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, June 20, 1990).
162. See general!y Ernst Baltensperger & Jean Dermine, European Banking: Prudential and Regulatory
Issues, in EURoFEAN BANIGNo IN THE 1990s, supra note 49, at 17, 25-26.
163. "Monetary and financial integration involves three distinct but interrelated components: (1)
the integration of capital movements; (2) the integration of financial services (including banking); and
(3) the integration of monetary policy (including exchange rate policy)." ToMMASO PADOA-SCHIOPPA,
FINANCIAL AND MONErARY INTEORATION IN EutoPa 1990, 1992 & BEYOND 2 (Group of Thirty
Occasional Papers No. 28, 1990). For a detailed bibliography and history of the movement towards
monetary union in the EC, see Mike Cooper, The European Monetary System and Economic and
Monetary Union, EUROPEAN ACcESS, Oct. 1990, at 37 (bibliographic review). Monetary union has
been defined as a currency area where economic policy is managed jointly. Two conditions must exist
to create a currency area: (I) exchange rates must be irrevocably fixed or a single currency must exist;
and (2) there must be complete and irreversible convertibility of currencies. Interview with Peter
Bekx, Administrator, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, Commission of the
European Communities, in Durham, N.C. (Oct. 7, 1991).
164. In fact, the link between monetary policy and integration efforts in areas outside the bank
regulatory context has been associated with company law. For example, the Draft Company Ac-
counts (Amendment) Directive states, in Paragraph 10, that:
[lit is important to promote European monetary integration by allowing companies to draw
up and publish their accounts in ECU. Council Directives 78/660 and 83/349... should
be clarified in this respect so as to require companies availing themselves of this possibility
to state the method they have used for conversion into ECU in the notes on the accounts.
Proposal for a Council Directive Amending Directive 78/660 on Annual Accounts and Directive 83/
349 on Consolidated Accounts with Respect to the Exemptions for Small and Medium-sized Compa-
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be incomplete without an inquiry into the monetary policy role and impli-
cations of future regulation in this area. 165 Even though there is a close
nexus between capital market activities and monetary policy, neither the
EEC Treaty nor the capital market Directives provide the legal basis for
forging a formal monetary union. However, the Second Banking Direc-
tive may indirectly create the preconditions for political, or formal, mone-
tary union.
This section will discuss the movement towards formal monetary
union in several stages. 166 First, it will give a brief sketch of the capital
markets and related monetary policy. Second, this section will focus on
the EEC Treaty, pointing out that it does not provide the legal basis for
monetary union. Third, secondary legislation, which does not expressly
provide for formal monetary union, will be analyzed. Finally, the specific
role of the new banking regulation scheme in creating a de facto monetary
union will be examined.
A. Credit Institutions, Capital Markets, and Monetary Policy:
A Brief Overview
The daily activities of a commercial bank 67 implicate monetary pol-
icy in three ways. First, a bank mobilizes savings into income-producing
loans; the interest rates charged to both activities directly affect the size of
the money supply. Regulatory efforts to control this money-creating as-
pect of a bank's business usually focus on the amount of reserves required
of a bank (those funds, extracted from circulation, cannot contribute to
money supply growth)168 and the interest rate charged to banks for short-
term borrowing from the central bank or national Treasury. Second, a
bank actively participates in the capital markets to hedge, or cover, the
risks it assumes as a lender. 169 Finally, to the extent that the first two
nies and to the Preparation and Publication of Accounts in ECU, para. 10, 1988 O.J. (C 287) 5, 6
[hereinafter Draft Company Accounts (Amendment) Directive].
165. "The banking system is one of the most important structural conditions affecting company
and capital market law." BUXBAUM & HoPr, supra note 12, at 192. See generally Cooke, supra note 38,
at 23-24; Zavvos, supra note 69, at 469 (attributing past difficulties in reaching agreement regarding
bank regulation in part to "the crucial function banking has in national economies and its concomi-
tant impact on national sovereignty. Harmonization in this sensitive sector has faltered on issues of
monetary and credit policy that implicate national economic policies generally.") (citations omitted).
166. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
167. These activities may be categorized functionally as follows: portfolio management, payment
mechanism, risk sharing services, and monitoring/information-related services. Baltensperger &
Dermine, supra note 162, at 25-26.
168. See generally Bernd Rudolph, Capital Requirements of German Banks and the European Economic
Community Proposals on Banking Superision, in EUROPEAN BANKING IN THE 1990s, supra note 49, at 357.
169. Regulatory efforts in this area focus on trading rules. Second Banking Directive, supra note
8, art. 14 (providing for cooperation between member states in the regulation of a financial institu-
tion's capital market activities). An example of a regulation governing these activities is Regulation
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activities render the bank insolvent, the bank must rely on the govern-
ment to compensate its depositors. Any payout to depositors will also
affect the money supply and interest rates.
The existence of openly fraudulent or insolvent banks creates a seri-
ous credibility problem for national banking and regulatory systems. Reg-
ulatory efforts in this area usually seek to prevent a credibility crisis by
providing for periodic review and disclosure of a bank's financial activi-
ties. This information is used to assess any exposure to risk by the gov-
ernment and to estimate the amount of reserves required to
counterbalance those risks. These latter regulations are the focus of re-
cent international coordination and can be grouped under the general
heading of "capital adequacy."170
The plight of depositors and customers of BCCI illustrates one of the
real financial burdens created by under-regulated financial institutions.
Whatever the allocation of regulatory jurisdiction, territorially based sov-
ereigns remain responsible to their nationals who are their primary depos-
itors. That responsibility takes two forms - creation of deposit
protection schemes (implicit or explicit) and democratic accountability
(unhappy depositors are unhappy voters).
In the United Kingdom, for example, the response to the BCCI de-
bacle included a payout from the Deposit Protection Fund (estimated at
costing a few hundred million pounds171 and covering about 40,000 de-
positors172). In addition, initial press reports considered the imposition of
a levy upon the United Kingdom's Big Four clearing banks173 in an at-
tempt to cover the costs of the payout.174 The British bankruptcy court
charged with liquidating the operations of BCCI in the United Kingdom
is considering a separate repayment plan. 75
No. 90-9 of 25th July 1990 on risks pertaining to interest rates on market transactions, Comit6 de la
Raglementation Bancaire, published in the French official gazette of 28th August 1990. Reglement
No. 90-09 du 25 juillet 1990 relatif au reisque de toux d'interet sur les operations de marche du
comit6 de la r~glementation bancaire, J.O., 28 aoiit 1990, at 10457.
170. See generaly Solvency Ratio Directive, supra note 81; Revised Basle Concordat on Principles
for the Supervision of Banks' Foreign Establishments, 22 IL.M. 900 (1983) [hereinafter Basle
Accords].
171. Truell & Bray, supra note 1, at A3.
172. Nicholas Bray & Peter Truell, Judge Halts a Liquidation of BCCI's U.K. Operations, WAu ST.
J., July 23, 1991, at Al7.
173. Clearing banks stand at the center of the banking system in the United Kingdom. On top of
handling deposits, loans, and money transfers, these institutions engage in corporate investment and
money market operations and often run finance houses. BANKING STRUCTUS, supra note 49, at 80-
82.
174. Truell & Bray, supra note 1, at A3.
175. Bray, supra note 142, at A7; Vaz, supra note 148, at A13.
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In other words, Host states can risk serious fiscal imbalances 176 and
electoral problems based on the transnational activities of credit institu-
tions regulated by Home states that are insulated from similarly direct
economic or political concerns. Both Home and Host states, of course,
face the same monetary policy risks, but those risks arise from different
sources. The concerns of each state will naturally be focused on local, not
foreign, matters. 177
The provisions in the Second Banking Directive that liberalize capi-
tal movements and significantly shift regulatory responsibility expose
Host states to considerable risks and require them to relinquish considera-
ble control over their own monetary policies. Viewed from this perspec-
tive, it should not be surprising that the United Kingdom ultimately took
the lead in coordinating enforcement actions against BCCI: the United
Kingdom sought control over a situation that would have profound mon-
etary and political repercussions in its own territory. Had the Second
Banking Directive been in force, these actions would have fallen within
Articles 14 or 21(5).
B. Treaty Provisions
As noted at the beginning of this article, the EC was created to serve
both economic and political purposes' 78 through a customs union. 179 In-
creasingly, free trade in goods implies free trade in financial services and
capital movements along with the need to eliminate restrictions in all
these areas.' 80 Indeed, "capital movements and financial services forge a
176. See generally Baltensperger & Dermine, supra note 162, at 26-33.
177. Brilmayer, supra note 31, at 20-21 (discussing the factors weighing against an extraterritorial
application of national law).
178. See generally T.C. HARmri.a, THE FOuNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN CoMMUNTY LAW (2d ed. 1988).
As Jacques Delors recently observed, "We are building a Community whose member states jointly
exercise a measure of pooled sovereignty through fully fledged common policies.... These are the
foundations of a community which, because of them, is now moving towards political union, which is
the ultimate objective of the Single European Act." Jacques Delors, European Integration and Security,
in EUROPEAN Access, June 1991, at 11, 13 (emphasis in original).
179. A customs union is an economic organization between sovereign states who agree to set
uniform tariffs for imports from nonmember countries while simultaneously eliminating tariffs for
similar imports from member countries. EEC TREAaxr art. 9. See also General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. XXIV(4), 61 Stat. A3, A67, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, 270.
180. Au fur et a m~sure que le march6 interieur se consolide avec l'6limination de ces obsta-
cles, le disparit~s des dispositions applicables a d'autres domaines de la vie 6conomique
peuvent porter prfjudice a la ralisation des objectifs 6conomiques et sociaux du Trait6 et
rendre nfcessaires des m~sures communautaires de rapprochement des l6gislations dans le
cadre des compftences conferees par le Trait6 aux institutions communautaires.
Pipkorn, supra note 108, at 23. (Ed. trans.: As the internal market is consolidated by the elimination
of these obstacles, the disparity of measures applicable to other economic areas can hinder the realiza-
tion of the economic and social objectives of the Treaty and render necessary community measures of
standardization in the context of competence conferred by the Treaty to the community
institutions.).
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direct link between the balance of payments and domestic monetary pol-
icy." 181 The legislative efforts in the EC banking sector relate to the EEC
Treaty mandate to liberalize capital movements as well as its mandate to
provide freedoms of establishment and provision of (financial) services
throughout the Community.182
The EEC Treaty does not, however, impose a directly binding obliga-
tion to achieve monetary union.183 Article 67(1) of the Treaty merely
requires member states to abolish "progressively... all restrictions on the
movement of capital.., and any discrimination based on the nationality
or on the place of residence of the parties or on the place where such
capital is invested." 184 Article 67 covers movements of capital associated
with financial operations, focusing on investment of those funds rather
than on payments for goods or services. Article 106 covers current pay-
ments made in connection with transfers of foreign exchange that consti-
tute consideration for a transaction.18 5 Before the late 1980s, efforts to
liberalize capital movement were limited to promoting the trade oriented
goals of the customs union. The Treaty permits large exceptions to the
Article 67 rule for a member state to deal effectively with capital market
fluctuations 8 6 and balance of payment problems.18 7
The traditional division between different types of capital move-
ments and their relation to the financial services sector has blurred in
recent years, potentially rendering the distinctions made by the EEC
Treaty somewhat obsolete. The high mobility of capital and currencies
conducted through credit institutions such as BCCI (transnational actors
created to evade regulatory restrictions or oversight) has played a large
role in clouding the formerly logical national boundaries. This is why the
181. PADOA-SCHIOPPA, supra note 163, at 2.
182. For an overview of the EC's efforts to liberalize capital movements, see generally EMMANUE.L
GaLLARD Er AL., LE MARCH9 UNIQUE EuROPtfaN 233 (Editions A. Pendone 1989); Peter Oliver & Jean-
Pierre Bache, Free Movement of Capital Between the Member States: Recent Developments, 26 COMMON
Mir. L Ray. 61 (1989).
183. Case 203/80, Criminal Proceedings Against Guerrino Casati, 1981 E.C.R. 2595, 2637, 1
C.M.LR. 365, 397 (1982). See also GAILUAD, supra note 182, at 233 ("Les mouvements de capitaux
ne font l'objet d'aucune dlfinition dans le Trait6 de Rome, ni dans le droit communautaire d6riv6.
Cette mbthode, consistant a rbglementer sans dbfinir, n'est pas propre au droit communautaire.").
(Ed. trans.: The movement of capital is not defined in the EEC Treaty, nor does it derive from
Community law. This method, regulating without defining, is not unique to Community law.).
184. EEC TRFATy art. 67(1).
185. Cases 286/82 & 26/83, Luisi & Carbone v. Ministero del Tesoro, 1984 E.C.R. 377, 404, 3
C.M.LR. 52, 81 (1985).
186. EEC TPEA¢r art. 73.
187. Id. arts. 108-09. This also reflects the view that "[t]ris peu d'Etats se sont estimls assez forts
pour prendre le risque, au dehfrs de toute obligation internationale, d'avoir ... une monnaie totale-
ment convertible." GAILLARD, supra note 182, at 235. (Ed. trans.: Very few nations consider them-
selves strong enough to take the risk, except under international obligation, of having a completely
convertible currency.).
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European Commission's Director General for Financial Institutions and
Company Law recently could link capital movements with financial serv-
ices despite the formal legal categories that seek to divide the two areas. 188
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has sought to extend the reach
of the EEC Treaty provisions as far as possible in recent years, holding
that transfers of currency within the EC in connection with certain ser-
vice-oriented expenses (tourism, business travel, study, or health care)
"constitute payments and not movements of capital, even where they are
effected by means of the physical transfer of bank notes... ." 189 As such,
the court ruled, service oriented expenses could not be subject to treaty
based restrictions.1 90
However, the ability of the ECJ to extend the reach of the EEC
Treaty provisions to create a monetary union remains limited to linking
capital movements to the trade in goods: "transfers of bank notes cannot
be regarded as necessary for the free movement of goods since it is a
method of payment which is not in conformity with standard prac-
tice."1 91 The perception of the status of standard commercial practice in
this area by the ECJ has received mixed reviews by legal commentators. 192
However, the limited holding reflects the EEC Treaty's self-imposed limi-
tations regarding liberalization of capital movements. That is, liberaliza-
tion of capital movements (upon which monetary union relies) must be
concretely connected to trade transactions and, moreover, must impede
such transactions before the EEC Treaty will protect or liberalize them.1 93
Thus, neither the ECJ194 nor the EEC Treaty can provide a sufficient
legal basis for increased monetary and financial integration through capi-
188. Our proposals to create a single market in financial services have two main compo-
nents. First, the sine qua non of a free market in financial services is the complete liberaliza-
tion of capital movements.... Second, we aim to open up the market for financial services
by removing barriers to the cross-border marketing of financial services and the free circula-
tion of financial products.
Geoffrey Fitchew, Overview: European Financial Markets-die Commission's Proposals, in EUROPEAN
Bm,NN IN mTE 1990s, supra note 49, at 7, 8-9.
189. Luisi & Carbone, 1984 E.C.R. at 408, 3 C.M.LR. at 82.
190. Id.
191. Case 308/86, Ministire Public v. R. Lambert, 1988 E.C.R. 4369, 4391, 3 C.M.L.R. 649, 661
(1989). The court in that case held that:
rules which require exporters to have foreign currency payable in respect of their sales paid
through a bank and to exchange such currency on the regulated foreign exchange market
and which as a result prohibit them from taking payment in banknotes, are not a barrier to
the liberalization of payments connected with the movement of goods ....
Id. at 4393, 3 C.M.LR. at 661.
192. See Oliver & Bache, supra note 182, at 80; John A. Usher, 1992 and the Implications for
Banking and Finance: An Overview, in THE SiNOLa MARKEr AND THE LAW oF BANKING, supra note 39, at
13.
193. Usher, supra note 192, at 14-15.
194. See Oliver & Bache, supra note 182, at 73-81, for a more detailed summary of the Court's
jurisprudence in this area, and for the conclusion that "[t]he case law of the Court has remained
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tal movement liberalization. This is one reason why a separate treaty gov-
erning these issues was necessary.
C. Secondary Legislation
Since the EEC Treaty provisions relating to capital movements do
not have direct effect in member states, they must be implemented by
directives. 195 Like the EEC Treaty, the directives categorized capital
movements by referring to their relationship to the goal of achieving a
common market for goods and services. Thus, the First Capital Move-
ments Directive196 created four categories of liberalization.1 97 Ultimately,
all categories were unconditionally liberalized, 198 thereby laying the
groundwork for "the removal of all obstacles to the execution of the capi-
tal transactions themselves"' 199 in the banking context as well as in the
trade arena.20°
timid but relates to the Capital Directives as they stood prior to the changes [of 1986 and 19881." Id.
at 81.
195. EEC TREATY art. 69. See also Casati, 1981 E.C.R. at 2614, 1 C.M.L.R. at 394; GAILLARD,
supra note 182, at 236-37.
196. Council Directive of 11 May 1960 for the Implementation of Article 67 of the Treaty, 1959-
62 O.J. SpEc. ED. 49 [hereinafter First Capital Directive], as amended by Council Directive 63/21 of 18
December 1962 Adding to and Amending the First Directive for the Implementation of Article 67 of
the Treaty, 1963-64 O.J. SPEc. ED. 5 [hereinafter Second Capital Directive]; Council Directive 86/566
of 17 November 1986 Amending the First Directive of 11 May 1960 for the Implementation of Arti-
cle 67 of the Treaty, 1986 O.J. (L 332) 22 [hereinafter Third Capital Directive]; Council Directive 88/
361 of 24June 1988 for the Implementation of Article 67 of the Treaty, 1988 O.J. (L 178) 5 [hereinaf-
ter Fourth Capital Directive].
197. First Capital Directive, supra note 196, Annex 1, List A-D. The List categories generally
follow the Treaty's distinction between current payments in Article 67 and financial operations in
Article 106. Thus, wide ranging liberalization is required for presumptively legitimate investment
activity in stock exchange transactions as well as for current transactions associated with trade. These
lists were merged by the Second Capital Directive to promote financial and monetary integration.
Second Capital Directive, supra note 196, art. 2. Of course, such distinctions were problematic from
a conceptual viewpoint, since "[a]u sens large, les mouvements de capitaux se definissent comme des
mouvements de fonds lis a une op/ration financire. Les transactions sont tant6t separ(es, tantt
confondues." GAILARD, supra note 182, at 252. (Ed. trans.: In a broad sense, the movement of
capital is defined as movements of funds linked to a financial operation. The transactions are at times
separated and at times mixed.). For a full discussion of the background and implications of this
merger, see Oliver & Bache, supra note 182, at 63-68.
198. Fourth Capital Directive, supra note 196, art. 1.
199. Oliver & Bache, supra note 182, at 68.
200. The link between the banking and monetary context, especially with regard to the Fourth
Capital Directive, has been articulated as follows in Gaillard: the Fourth Capital Directive
ne saurait toutefois Etre considerte isolement: c'6st grace au jeu conjugu6 de la libre circula-
tion des mouvements de capitaux et du libre acces aux produits et services financiers l6gale-
ment offerts et, commercialis&s que se rfalisera la v(ritable integration flnanciare
europ(enne, les Etats membres de la Communaut6 constituant alors un espace financier
unifi .
GAILLARD, supra note 182, at 244. (Ed. trans.: should nevertheless be considered separately: thanks
to the conjugated interplay of free circulation of capital and free access to products and financial
[Vol. 2:89
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Even with the far-reaching consequences of the Directives, the EC
cannot create monetary union by administrative fiat, because complete
liberalization of capital movements implies significant shifts in sovereignty
beyond the scope of the EEC Treaty.20 1 Since the EEC Treaty limits the
EC in its efforts to create a monetary union, the Community must pro-
ceed cautiously. To stay within the terms of the EEC Treaty, the EC can
create the foundation for economic and financial union only by broaden-
ing the reach of financial services Directives.
Increased financial interaction through the removal of branching re-
strictions and the elimination of duplicative administrative obligations
will allow the market to create a measure of economic integration that the
EEC Treaty cannot demand.20 2 The liberalization of capital markets and
the consequent interdependence of financial markets can be characterized
as a "mutual reinforcing process." 20 3 Concentration of regulatory au-
thority and financial information in the Home state makes the sharing of
sovereign decision making a matter of legal obligation and habit. This,
combined with increased cooperation between national regulatory author-
ities, created the institutional backdrop for formal monetary union.
services legally offered and commercialized that will make the true European financial integration be
realized, the member states of the community then constituting a unified financial space.).
201. Les mouvements de capitaux (c'est.a-dire les opirations financi-res qui possident leur
finalit6 propre et ne correspondent pas n~cessairement a une contreprestation sous-jacent)
posent 6galement des problimes r~doutables pour l'imperium 6atique. La libert6 des paie-
ments en capital peut compromettre la stabilit6 des taux de change ou d~s~quilibrer la poli-
tique 6conomique monetaire interne des Etats .... Bien que le Trait6 air inclus la libert6 de
circulation des capitaux parmi les liberts de circulation fondamentales, elle n'est pas sur le
mime plan que celles qui concernent les marchandises, les personnnes ou les services.
GAmLuA, supra note 182, at 232. (Ed. trans.: Capital movements (that is financial operations that
have their own finality) also present serious problems for the imperium of states. The freedom of
capital payments may compromise the stability of exchange rates or destabilize states' internal mone-
tary policies. Although the Treaty included the free circulation of capital among the fundamental
freedoms of circulation, it is not on the same plan as those regarding goods, people, or services.).
L'intagration financi~re de la Communaut6 devrait conduire les Etats membres a accepter a
terme une integration monetaire poussae. Seul l'adoption d'une monnaie unique ou de
parits fixaes entre les devises des Etats membres, la conduite d'une politique monetaire
commune avec la creation d'une banque centrale europaenn~e ... permettrait en effet de
rfaliser une veritable Europe monetaire.
Id. at 261. (Ed. trans.: The financial integration of the Community should eventually drive the
member states to accept substantial monetary integration. Only the adoption of a single currency or
fixed exchange between Member States, the development of a common monetary policy with the
creation of a central European bank, would permit in effect, the realization of a true European
currency.)
202. See PADOA-SCHIOPPA, supra note 163, at 5 ("the convergence of national regulatory systems
... should be brought about by market forces or, to be more precise, by the interaction between
market forces and national regulators"). See generally Wilfried Guth, EuROPE IN THE NiNEnEs:
PROBums S AsPI.AxMNs 4 (Group of Thirty Occasional Papers No. 30, 1990) (delivered at a meet-
ing of the European/Atlantic Group in London on March 21, 1990).
203. Interview with Peter Bekx, supra note 163.
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As early as 1969, the EC realized the importance of such coopera-
tion, asserting that "consultation should cover any important measures
contemplated by a member state which might have a substantial impact
on the economies of the other Community countries."20 4 The recent re-
marks of Sir Leon Brittan reflect this broader perspective:
The rapid and reliable movement of goods or services across frontiers
must be matched by an equally efficient provision of payment in return
if the internal market is to become a reality, particularly for smaller
businesses. Furthermmore [sic], the progressive move towards eco-
nomic and monetary union highlights the need for the development of
payment and settlement systems which transcend national currency
boundaries, so that individuals, tourists or travellers can benefit from
lower charges and better services.20 5
Coherent and coordinated monetary policy requires increased coopera-
tion and shared information as "necessary preconditions" for further in-
tegration.20 6 The Second Banking Directive seeks to promote such policy
coordination with the long-term goal of facilitating monetary union.
D. Banking Legislation and De Facto Monetary Union
Just as cooperation between trade authorities and common tariff pol-
icies provided the backdrop for EC banking regulation, existing banking
and capital movements legislation creates the framework for monetary
union by increasing the interdependence of each member state's economy
upon cross-border (EC) financial activity through the single license;207 in-
stitutionalizing detailed and regular cooperation between monetary au-
thorities of the member states; and centralizing and consolidating data
collection in specific member states.20 8
204. EUROPFAN COMMUNmES MoNErARY COMMr=raa, ELE.vmH REPORT ON THE AcnvrnEs OF THe
MONrAt COMMrrT= 10 (1969).
205. Commission, Spokesman's Service (Press Release, IP91) 240, (1991) quoted in Ian Thomson,
International Market Developments March-May 1991, EuROPEAN AccEss, June 1991, at 22, 22.
206. Interview with Ivo Maes, Professor, University of Antwerp and Economist, National Bank of
Belgium, in Durham, N.C. (Oct. 3, 1991).
207. For example, United Kingdom Prime Minister John Major recently articulated a three point
British agenda for monetary union. Major's third point was that ". . . the development of monetary
cooperation must depend on much greater progress towards economic convergence between member
states. The gaps at present are simply too wide. To rush forward and ignore them would be to risk
economic failure." John Major, The Evolution of Europe, Speech Delivered to the Konrad
Adenauer Foundation in Bonn, Germany (March 11, 1991), in EuRoPEAN AccEss, June 1991, at 7, 9.
Point One stressed the importance of price stability as the "prime objective of monetary policy," id. at
9, and Point Two stressed the importance of "free and open markets... the Community must devote
the same energy to its program for the single financial area as to proposals for subsequent stages of
the EMU process." Id.
208. Alternatively, these can be categorized as harmonization, mutual recognition and Home
country control or supervision. Fitchew, supra note 188, at 9. In fact, the EC Monetary Policy Com-
mittee identified the importance of "greater coordination and consistency of national rules governing
financial markets.. ." in guiding capital market liberalization efforts in 1985, long before the Second
[Vol. 2:89
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1. Second Order Consequences of a Single License. On its face, the
Second Banking Directive seems to avoid monetary policy issues.209 But
the very avoidance of those issues against a backdrop of comprehensive
harmonization suggests separate, more political, rationales for the
exclusion.
The political will to coordinate monetary policy and share sensitive
national treasury information coalesced as recently as late 1991.210 The
member states implicitly recognized that, to the extent that financial serv-
ices integration and capital market liberalization create economic interde-
pendence, national attempts to regulate previously national economic
sectors will be overrun. The tensions created by that interdependence
compel political recognition of irreversible economic ties, creating the
political consensus for monetary union.211
The Second Banking Directive, then, is likely to create or exacerbate
certain jurisdictional conflicts by removing deposit insurance and mone-
tary policy from harmonization. This will occur as financial institutions'
cross-border financing activities increasingly put domestic depositors
(and national treasuries) at risk. The need to resolve these conflicts is
likely to create the requisite consensus to coordinate monetary policies
and then formulate a monetary union. This link between coordinated
policy and the avoidance of conflicts was identified in the 1982 Monetary
Policy Committee Report as a means of furthering capital market
liberalization.212
2. Monetary Cooperation. Monetary union cannot be created in a
vacuum. The pursuit of common monetary policies implies extensive co-
operation between nations. It also implies trust in the communications
from, and intentions of, participants in the monetary policy dialogue.
Trust and candor cannot be created overnight. Nor can they successfully
be mandated by law or treaty. Even with a certain degree of de facto
Directive was promulgated. EuRoPEAN COMMUNITIES MONETARY COMMITEF, TWEsmN-SEvenm RE-
PORT ON THE AcnvmEs OF THE MONETARY CoMMrTTEE 10 (1986).
209. See discussion of Article 14, supra part I.D.2.
210. At the end of September, the EC's Finance Ministers reached agreement in principle on the
trickiest points regarding economic union. EC member states would be invited to join the Economic
and Monetary Union beginning in 1997 based on meeting certain specific criteria: (1) they must have
low inflation rates; (2) their currencies must have fluctuated within a narrow one percent band for at
least three years; (3) their deficit to GDP ratio must not exceed three to four percent and (4) there
must be convergence in interest rates. Those member states not meeting these criteria would be
permitted certain "derogations." The United Kingdom retains the right to decline membership. In-
terview with Peter Bekx, supra note 163. In early December, the member states concluded a formal
treaty concerning these issues in Mastricht, Netherlands. See supra note 18.
211. Interview with Peter Bekx, supra note 163.
212. EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES MONETARY COMMITTEE, TWVY-TuRD REPORT ON THE AcTrnEs
OF THE MONETARY COMMITTEE 8, 35 (1982).
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economic integration, the process of building trust and the common poli-
cies necessary for realizing monetary union must be a gradual one. In
addition, given the constraints of the EEC Treaty, the coordination of
monetary policies must also be indirect.
The EC possesses two tools for indirectly achieving a coordinated
monetary policy: harmonizing prudential regulation of the banking busi-
ness2 13 and increasing cooperation between monetary and bank regula-
tory authorities. 214 As discussed above,2 15 the Second Banking Directive
creates the framework for communication, consultation, and coordinated
action between bank regulatory authorities. Since many bank regulatory
authorities are also national central banks, the Second Banking Directive
institutionalizes open channels of communication and cooperation re-
garding economic and monetary policy. Of course, the existence of an
institutional framework alone does not guarantee its efficacy. The success
of the system requires considerable political will among the separate
states, and much patience.2 16
The political will (and legal obligation) for such cooperation can be
found not only in the new treaty and banking Directives, but also in the
capital market legislation. The Fourth Capital Directive directly ad-
dresses the link between banking and monetary activities. Article 2 of
that Directive requires national regulatory authorities to notify the Com-
mission, via the EC Monetary Committee and the Committee of Gover-
nors of the Central Banks, of regulatory efforts regarding liquidity
measures. 217 Moreover, Article 2 of the Fourth Capital Directive empow-
213. "A free capital market with maximum harmonization of legal provisions would promote the
development of a unified internal market within the Community." EUROPEAN COMMUNMES MONE-
TARY ComarrrEE, TWENTY-Stx=H REPORT ON THE Acmvmas OF THE MONETARY COMMITrEE 9 (1985).
214. GmuARD, supra note 182, at 241 (The Commission's goals in the banking arena are as
follows: "La Commission a soulign6 qu'une 'liberalisation plus pouss6e des mouvements de capitaux
dans la Communaut6 devrait servir trois objectifs: donner au march6 unique une dimension
financiire, assurer la stabilit6 mon6taire, favoriser le d6veloppement &onomique de la Communaut6
en assurant une repartition optimale de l'6pargne europhenne.' "). (Ed. trans.: The Commission has
stressed that a greater liberalization of movements of capital in the Community should serve three
goals: (1) to give a financial dimension to the single market; (2) to assure monetary stability; and (3)
to aid economic development of the Community by insuring an ideal distribution of European
Savings.).
215. See supra part III.
216. For example, the member states spent three years trying to coordinate their actions vis-a-vis
BCCI. This is a problem endemic to the nature of communication between bureaucracies and other
actors seeking to further their own parochial interests. Crovitz, supra note 67, at A9; Kenneth A.
Bacon, Multinational Banks Are Likely to Face Stricter Oversight in the U.S. and Europe, WALL ST. J., Aug.
23, 1991, at A2.
217. Fourth Capital Directive, supra note 196, art. 2. It should be remembered that the liquidity
measures at issue (capital adequacy requirements, limits on the type and quality of risk exposure, etc.)
are the same as those dealt with by the Solvency Ratio Directive, supra note 81, and the Basic Ac-
cords, supra note 170.
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ers the Commission to decide whether such measures taken by national
bank regulatory authorities are necessary for the purpose of monetary
regulation. 218
V. CONCLUSION
The Second Banking Directive seeks to facilitate monetary integra-
tion by creating clear lines of regulatory authority. To that end, it also
creates clear rules for sovereign cooperation and joint decision making
over matters with a strong monetary component.2 19 These rules eliminate
some of the regulatory discrepancies which BCCI manipulated to escape
effective oversight for many years. They also indirectly promote the for-
mation of a monetary union.
Merely eliminating branching restrictions by creating a single license
would not provide the certainty and cooperation between government
officials that is necessary to form the foundation for monetary union. As
the BCCI example illustrates, significant monetary policy issues remain
outside the reach of the Second Banking Directive. The development of
clear rules regarding prescriptive and enforcement competence promotes
the long-term goals of the EC in the financial arena by making common-
place the sharing of sovereignty over regulatory and monetary matters.
218. Fourth Capital Directive, supra note 196, art. 2. It should also be noted that the European
Commission plans to set up two committees to study the payments system in the EC: one will focus
on technical issues, and the other will represent the banking sector (including banking customers).
Thomson, supra note 205, at 22.
219. As one commentator has noted, "[The distinction between provisions designed to ensure
bank solvency on the one part, and to regulate monetary policy on the other, is not always an easy
one to make." Marc Dassess, Retail Banking Services in 1992, in THE SINGLE MARKET AND THE LAW OF
BANKING, supra note 39, at 51, 65.
"It is true that [monetary union] will mean transfers of sovereignty, particularly with the
creation of a European Central Bank. But this is not so much a great leap forward as a
logical consequence of the success of the European Monetary System ... [European union]
cannot be achieved unless the Community acquires: a distinct political identity and the
influence derived from economic strength. The two are intimately linked.
Delors, supra note 178, at 13.
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